

THE
SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
VOL. VIII. No. 4. OCTOBER, 1915—JANUARY, 1916.

EDITORIAL NOTES.

During the autumn months a Civic Survey of Westminster and Chelsea was carried on by a group of architects and artists under the auspices of the Cities Committee of the Sociological Society and the Civics Laboratory of Crosby Hall. The resulting drawings and diagrams were exhibited at the Rooms of the Society in December. Those responsible for the Survey hope to commence its publication in book form at no distant date. The first instalment of the Westminster Survey will appear under the title "Westminster, historic, contemporary and incipient—an Interpretative Survey and Outline of Policy." For this a member of the Committee has written the letterpress. The greater part of his introductory chapter on method, and the whole of that on the mediaeval city, appear in this number of the REVIEW. The Cities Committee, it should be explained, was formed in 1908 to promote civic sociology. Its work is partly outside the scope of the Sociological Society, which therefore, it will be clear, takes no responsibility for the facts and views expressed in the Survey.

The immediate occasion for the Westminster and Chelsea Survey was provided by the war. To meet the dislocation of the architectural profession caused by the general stoppage of building, there was organised, mainly through the efforts of the Royal Institute of British Architects, a series of civic surveys at various places throughout the country. The Cities Committee of the Sociological Society may fairly claim some share in this initiative, if not directly yet indirectly, for they have taken no inconsiderable part in the long-continued exposition and propagandism to substantiate the idea of the civic survey, to clarify its purpose and to work out its method. In all these respects much remains to be done. And it was in part with a view towards supplementing the efforts of the R.I.B.A. that the Cities Committee commenced the Westminster and Chelsea survey last autumn. Only in the smallest way was it possible to organise the survey as a war relief measure. But a more ambitious hope was entertained of influencing in a sociological direction the method and the purpose of the numerous surveys now being carried on under the direction of the R.I.B.A. But the appeal is not only to architects and to town-planners. It is even more to educationists and citizens in general. As "Nature Study" has now happily established itself in the schools as the right method—at once visual, first-hand, open-air—of approaching the several natural sciences, so the civic survey is advocated as the

similar concrete and complementary way of beginning the study of the several social sciences, including amongst these both history and human geography.

A further claim is made by the advocates of the civic survey and its counterpart the rural survey, which together combine into the Regional Survey. Starting out in the detached and dispassionate spirit of the naturalist to observe things as they are, the regional surveyor passes on to the study of how they have become as they are; and as the final reward of his research he begins to see something of the whither they are tending. From the observation of actual tendencies, the student is led on, by natural and even inevitable sequence, to a valuation of such tendencies. Ethical considerations thus emerge, and a bridge is thereby built for the passage from theory to practice, from science to art. Hence it is claimed that the regional survey, by its interpretations of historical values, constitutes the natural basis, grounded in the essential significance of things, on which to rear a framework of practical policy. Or, as the writer of the article in this number of the REVIEW puts it, "an interpretative survey has its final purpose and justification in the outline of policy which it yields and which is really its extension into the world of practice."

The opening paper—Mr. Zimmern's "Nationality and Government"—raises issues of the first importance. What relation does the concept of the "State" hold to that of the "Nation"? That is a question underlying alike the tasks of European reconstruction and the problems of clear political thinking which should prepare for the work of practical statesmanship. Mr. Zimmern's own answer to the question he raises turns on the contrast between the objective and the subjective aspects of public life. On the one side are the material forces of government—administrative officialdom, law courts, police and military and naval forces, etc. On the other are the immaterial influences that mould public sentiment and form public opinion. Mr. Zimmern sees the former set of forces, under certain conditions, concentrating as the "State"; the latter as the "Nation." It is an interesting hypothesis and merits the most thoroughgoing investigation and discussion. A symposium on it is being organised, by which we hope to collect the views of representative thinkers both inside and outside the Society. Their contributions will appear in the next issue of the REVIEW. We should be glad to receive communications on the subject from members.

One of the predictions to which the war has given rise is that the concept of Empire will give place in general European vogue to that of Commonwealth; and in this connection it is significant to note that the most thoughtful and scholarly group of British Imperialists already begin to speak of the British Commonwealth. Another current forecast is that in the *post-bellum* reconstruction

of the occidental world, its states and nations will begin to mass themselves in three large groups—two nucleating round the present belligerents and a third aggregating as Pan-America. If both these predictions be based on real and dominant tendencies, there should be a movement towards a Rhine-Danube group of Commonwealths, a Pan-American group and a third with less unified geographical basis. All such speculations are desirable in so far as they stimulate first-hand study of realities, especially such as can be tested by recourse to history and geography. Mr. Wicksteed's article in the present number suggests some of the broad lines on which such studies might proceed. His idea of an "Atlantic Fellowship" is happily phrased and should provoke discussion. Concurrently there should be studied such incipient actualities as the movement in the United States for closer political relations with Great Britain, which is manifesting itself in various forms, amongst others a call for a *post-bellum* naval entente. That, as other American movements of significant content and larger outlook, may best be followed in the pages of the "New Republic," an organ which in a remarkably short space of time has become for many English readers an indispensable guide to reflective and informed opinion in the United States.

In the programme for the present term there are two general meetings of exceptional interest. Mrs. St. Clair Stobart (Mrs. Greenhalgh) will give an address on "The Meaning of the War from a Woman's Point of View." The fact that Mrs. Stobart went through both the Balkan Wars and also was with the Serbian army throughout its last stand in the present war constitutes but a part of her warrant to interpret war from a woman's point of view. Mrs. Stobart's writings give evidence that she combines in unusual degree mental qualities seldom found together in either sex. To clear thought and large vision she adds sympathetic insight and dramatic power. By good fortune the Society will also have on its platform this term a French thinker and writer who represents one of the less noticed but not least significant movements which have constituted, so to speak, the spiritual preparation for the present intimacy of the Franco-English Alliance. M. Paul Mantoux, some fifteen years ago, published a large work on "The Industrial Revolution," for which the preliminary studies were made mainly in England. By this work M. Mantoux contributed to the growing number of specialised researches on English movements, social, economic and literary, by which French writers have of late given us new clues to the interpretation of our own history and institutions. Recognition of M. Mantoux's labours and services was made two years ago when he was offered and accepted a specially created chair in the University of London. On the outbreak of war he joined the French army at the front. At present he is in London on a special mission. His paper to the Society will address itself to the question of what lesson we may read from the war as to how far the individual is a cause of historical events and how far such events are brought about by impersonal social forces.

Professor Fleure, of Aberystwyth, will read a paper this term on "Berlin and its Region" at a meeting of the Cities Committee, convened to consider a proposal to organise a series of studies on "The War Capitals in Relation to their Regions, considered historically and geographically." It is not proposed that the studies should be in any sense of a general and popular character, but as recondite and technical as the available specialist resources necessitate. But members who are interested in geographical and historical studies are invited to hear Professor Fleure's paper, so far as the limited accommodation at the Society's rooms permits. Those desiring to be present should send a postcard to the Assistant Secretary to ascertain date and hour of the meeting.

Amongst public activities connected with the war, initiated or directed in part by members of the Society, two recent movements of special interest, in a sociological sense, may be noted. The first is an organised endeavour to bring home to the public and maintain in individual consciousness, the moral issues at stake between the two groups of belligerents. Statements of the aims and scope of the "Fight for Right" movement are being issued from its offices (Trafalgar House, Waterloo Place). A fuller and more reasoned exposition—as clear as it is persuasive—appears in the current number of the "Quest" by Sir Francis Younghusband, the founder of the movement. Another interesting adventure of moral purpose and sociological import is a scheme of ten lectures on "Ideals in Social Reconstruction" initiated and organised by a lady member of the Society. The lectures will take place in the Queen's (Small) Hall, Langham Place, on Saturdays at three, beginning February 12th.

THE Editors of the REVIEW have to apologise to members for delay in its issue and also for curtailment of its size. The REVIEW has never been self-supporting, and to aid the Society in its publication a guarantee fund was created, which terminated unfortunately in this very year of national stress and strain. The Council of the Society has therefore hesitated to ask the guarantors to renew their support and is endeavouring for the time being to continue the REVIEW with such means as are at its disposal. But in this interval of impoverishment it becomes necessary to institute economies. The first is to reduce the number of pages in the REVIEW, and another is to make fewer than the customary four issues per annum. How much curtailment in both respects may be necessary in the course of the year cannot at the moment be determined. But the Council will make every endeavour to diminish the publication as little as possible.

NATIONALITY AND GOVERNMENT.¹*Introductory Note.*

The following paper was originally written to be read aloud, without thought of publication. In committing it to the printer it should be stated, to guard against any possible misunderstanding, that it is, purely and simply, a critical examination of ideas, not a condemnation of projects. Criticism of 'the principle of Nationality' does not imply any want of sympathy with those who proclaim it as their watchword: nor does criticism of the 'international' solutions proposed in some quarters imply any hostility towards the aims of their framers. The sole object has been to pierce below the surface to the real meaning of the ideas and phrases in question in the belief that, as confused thinking must always lead to mistakes and disillusionment, so right thinking is the necessary prelude to a wise and consistent idealism.

THERE is no more important duty at the present moment for those who can spare the time and the thought from more practical tasks than the close and searching analysis of political ideas. The war is being waged about ideas, and the settlement at its close will be determined by ideas. Yet those ideas, and the words in which they are embodied for current discussion, are often vague, confused and even contradictory: so that different words are used to express the same meaning, and the same word used to express several different meanings. My aim in the present paper is to interpret as clearly and definitely as I can what I conceive to be the meaning and importance of two such ideas, in the name of which thousands have laid down their lives in the last sixteen months—the idea of nationality and the idea of citizenship.

My object is not to persuade or convert, but simply to elucidate and to clarify. To many people my views on the subject, put on half a sheet of notepaper, would seem pure platitude: others may think them utterly paradoxical. I shall be satisfied if I really make them plain, and if I succeed in provoking a discussion which ends in everybody feeling clearer in their own minds as to the views they respectively hold.

Argument on abstract subjects is much more inspiring and much easier to follow if it is enlivened by criticism. I propose therefore, not baldly and blankly to state my own views first, but

1. A paper read before the Sociological Society, November 30, 1915, Professor Graham Wallas in the chair.

to lead up to them by examining certain prevalent phrases or catch-words which have lately passed into common currency among the public, without perhaps receiving their due share of criticism and cross examination.

The first word which I will put in the dock is the word "international." I am constantly meeting people who profess what they call international sympathies, who belong to international clubs or promote international causes or study international relations. Being international myself, in a precise sense of the word, I am anxious to know exactly what they mean. So far as I am able to make out, the word international has about seven different meanings. For the moment I only want to distinguish two of them—or rather, to divide the seven into two groups. Half the people who use the word international are thinking of something which concerns one or more nations: the other half are thinking of something which concerns one or more Sovereign States. When we speak of an English international footballer we mean a man who has represented England against Wales or Scotland or Ireland. We are not concerned with the purely political question whether Scotland, Ireland and Wales are Sovereign States independent of England. Similarly, if we speak of a writer having an international reputation we mean that his books are read by people of many different nations and have possibly been translated into many different languages—into German, Italian, Bohemian, Polish, Finnish, Serbo-Croat, and so on. Similarly, when we speak of an international movement we mean that it has taken root in many different countries—in Germany, Italy, Canada, Finland, Syria, and so on—irrespective of the question whether these countries form part of one or more Sovereign States. But when we talk of "international law" or "an International Concert of the Powers" on the other hand, we are using the word in quite a different sense. We are dealing with quite a different method of classification: we are thinking of the world as consisting, not of nations, but of States. For the international football player Canada, South Africa and Australia would all be separate units, while the various Central American States, if they wanted to produce a team, would probably have to club together to do so. But for the international lawyer Canada, South Africa and Australia are merged in the British Commonwealth, Bohemia merged in Austria-Hungary, Syria in the Ottoman Empire and Finland in the Russian, while Nicaragua, Bolivia, Montenegro and Liberia are classified separately, as Sovereign States, ostensibly on a level with the Great Powers. Just as Rhode Island and Texas are both equally component members of the American Union, so the representatives of Montenegro and Russia, Ecuador and Great Britain would sit side by side in a world congress of Sovereign States, from which the

representatives of great civilized communities like Canada and Australia would be excluded.

This distinction between Nationality and Statehood, thus revealed in the double use of the word "international," is so simple that it seems strange that it should be necessary to call attention to it at all. Looked at in the light of concrete instances it is as clear as daylight. Scotland is a nation and not a State. So is Poland. So is Finland. So is Australia. Austria-Hungary is a State and not a nation. So is the Ottoman Empire. So is the British Commonwealth. So is the United States. It may not be easy to define exactly what a State is. It is certainly not easy to define exactly what a nation is. But at least it ought to be easy to perceive that there is a difference between the two.

Yet how many current catchwords there are which have acquired their vogue simply by slurring that difference over! If matters which affected two or more States were always called "inter-State" instead of "international," and the word "international" confined to its strict sense, some of those who have the word most often on their lips would discover, perhaps with a shock, that much of what they are pleading for is already embodied in contemporary life. We are in fact living in what is, in the strictest sense, an international society. For good or for evil, the modern world is a large-scale world, and, as Mr. Norman Angell truly pointed out, its most characteristic institutions, those connected with finance, industry and commerce, are largely international in character. And not only business, but other departments of life have become international also. Science and art, philanthropy and even sport have followed the financiers. Toynbee Hall, the mother of settlements, has scores of children in the United States. The hats that are worn in Paris one season are worn at Athens and Bucharest the next: and if the climate forbids young Italians and Greeks from indulging in English athletic pursuits, they can at least pay tribute to the internationalism of sport by appearing in English sporting costumes. The ideas which are in vogue in London and Berlin to-day are the talk of New York and Chicago to-morrow, and long after they have been exploded in the Old World continue to form the staple of leader writers in the New. Good books, and even bad books, if sufficiently striking and well advertised, are read and quoted all over the world. Mr. Norman Angell and General Bernhardi have done the Grand Tour together: and each is now engaged in the Herculean task of correcting what have become international interpretations or misinterpretations of their views. The modern world is in fact international to the core. Its internationalism lies in the nature of things. It is neither to its credit nor to its discredit. Internationalism is neither good nor bad in the abstract: it depends on the nature of its manifestations. The

German Wolff Bureau is international; so is the White Slave traffic; so is the Anti-Slavery Society. It rests with men and women of goodwill to see that the good manifestations prevail over the evil; but, judging from past history, the devil generally has the first innings. International institutions and international philanthropic efforts have followed international abuses, as the policeman follows the malefactor or as the agents of civilized governments follow, in 'undeveloped' countries, the roving emissaries of private capitalist enterprise.

Nor has this internationalism, this inter-communication between the families of mankind, been abruptly cut short by the war. On the contrary it has been immensely extended. Never before have the communities and races of men met and mingled as they are meeting and mingling to-day. The war, which has touched all five continents of the world, has turned the earth into a vast mixing-bowl where men, and to no inconsiderable extent women also, are coming together and exchanging experiences. The rival combatants and their prisoners can perhaps learn little from one another: but think of the Allied armies and their encampments on either side! For the illiterate millions of Russia, with its wonderful assortment of nationalities, war, with its camp-fire talk, has always been a great educator. The Russian army might be described as a great national and international school. But with the Western allies it is almost more so. Was there ever a more international expedition than the army at the Dardanelles? It comprised Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotsmen, Frenchmen, Senegalese, Sikhs, Gurkhas, Australians, New Zealanders, Maoris, and a contingent of Hebrew-speaking Jews from Palestine. Compare the catalogue of Sir Ian Hamilton's troops with the catalogue of the Greek and Trojan forces conveniently provided for us in the second book of the "Iliad," and you will get some measure of the increased power of man over nature since Homer's day, and of the internationalism which has inevitably resulted from it.

What then do a certain school of idealists really mean when they consider themselves a small group of internationalists in a world that will not listen to their doctrine? What they really mean, of course, is not that the modern world is not international in many of its habits and ways of thought, but that, in spite of its internationalism, it is still a tragically mismanaged place. It may be a single society, but that society has so little control over its life, or the members of it have such low ideals, that it is from time to time rent by such conflicts as we see to-day. Why, they complain, cannot the different communities of the world sit down together and cultivate the arts of Peace?

The criticism contained in remarks such as these is really a two-fold one. It is one thing to say that the world is wicked. It

is quite another to say that it is badly organized. The school of thought to which I am referring really combines two quite separate lines of policy. There is the policy directed towards making the world better, and the policy directed towards making the world better organised, irrespective of the fact whether or not that organisation is based on moral principles. Let us take the former policy first. The policy which seems to make the world better aims at promoting internationalism in its better, and at counteracting it in its worse, manifestations. It seeks to promote anti-Slavery Societies and to counteract the White Slave traffic. It seeks to promote happier and friendlier relations between nations and to counteract the international phenomenon that has become known as "Prussianism" in whatever quarter it originates and over however many countries it may spread. It seeks in fact to serve humanity by raising its moral level. One may criticise the phraseology or note the omissions in the programme of this group of thinkers: but for their outlook and their ideals one can have nothing but admiration. Men like M. Romain Rolland and women like Miss Jane Addams are the salt of the earth; if everybody were like Miss Addams the evil manifestations of internationalism would disappear for want of a public, and world-government itself—the inter-State problem—would be greatly simplified. It is easy to pick holes in the views expressed by this school of thinkers on the questions at issue in the inter-State sphere, but it is a thankless task to do so, since those problems are not really what they are concerned about. They are not interested in the purely political side of inter-State relations. Their object is not to establish a reasonable minimum of Justice and Liberty in a world of imperfect human beings. Their object is to make those imperfect people better, to combat malice, hatred and uncharitableness among all the belligerent peoples from their rulers and foreign ministers downwards. All power to their elbow! Only let us whisper one caution in their ear as they go on their errand of mercy—the famous caution of George Washington: "Influence is not government." However good and reasonable you may make people, there still remains over, for all of us who are not theoretical anarchists, the technical political question of the adjustment of the relations between the different Sovereign States.

I pass to the second line of policy—that which is directed not towards making men better (that, it is recognized, is too lengthy a process to meet the immediate emergency), but rather to averting war by making the world better organised—by improving the efficiency of the world's political machinery. This line of policy aims at the setting up of what is called an international or super-national organisation to ensure the peace of the world. Mr. Sidney Webb, for instance, is giving a lecture this very evening on "The

Supernational Authority which will Prevent War" and Mr. J. A. Hobson has written a book on the same theme under the title "Towards International Government." A pedant might criticise Mr. Hobson's title by saying that international government is a thing we have with us already—in Russia, in Turkey, in Austria-Hungary, in the British Commonwealth. Some of these governments are good and others bad, but they are all international, or, more strictly speaking, multi-national. If he had called his book "Towards Inter-State Government" his theme would have been made clear beyond all confusion; but he would have been convicted of working for a contradiction, for there is no such thing as inter-State government. If a government cannot give orders and secure obedience to them, it is not a government: but the essence of a State is that it is sovereign and takes orders from no one above it. Inter-State government therefore involves a contradiction. What Mr. Hobson really desires is a World-Government, and I wish he had said so. Probably he did not do so because he thought the title sounded too chimerical. But in reality there is nothing inconceivable or intrinsically impossible in the establishment of a world-government. The real difficulty is to establish free world-government—to ensure universal peace without the universal sacrifice of liberty. If it is better organisation that civilized mankind desires they can have it in almost any age for the asking. The Romans were ready to give it them; so were the great Popes; so was Napoleon; so are the Germans. There is no technical objection that I can see to the practicability of schemes like Mr. Hobson's. They involve the surrender of British, French, American and other sovereignties into the hands of a body in which the nominees of Russian, German, Hungarian and Turkish autocracy would have a proportionate voice. If the citizens of free States wish to surrender their heritage of freedom and to merge their allegiance with that of subjects accustomed to arbitrary rule, there is no more to be said. Peace and order and prosperity they may for a time receive in exchange. These may be goods more valuable than liberty. Many persons think they are, especially for other people. Our existing industrial order, for instance, is based upon the idea that efficiency is more important than liberty. But few Englishmen would hesitate to include liberty as an indispensable element in that 'good life' which it is the sole object of politics to promote. Judged by that ultimate test and in the light of the political ideals and constitutions of the existing States of the world, Mr. Hobson's and all other similar schemes fall to the ground.

So far we have been engaged in cross-examining the word international, and it has helped to bring out certain important distinctions. I now propose to put into the dock a more serious

offender, whom I think it will be useful to examine on our way to positive conclusions. I propose to take the third of the four points put forward as the programme of the Union of Democratic Control. It is not very different on the constructive side from suggestions by other writers who hold widely different views on the war. I select it because it crystallizes a mass of current thought in a conveniently compact and definite form. The 'plank' in question is as follows :—

"The foreign policy of Great Britain shall not be aimed at creating Alliances for the purpose of maintaining the 'Balance of Power'; but shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be public, with such machinery for securing international agreement as shall be the guarantee of an abiding peace."

This sentence contains a negative half and a positive half. I will not dwell on the negative half, as it is not relevant to our subject, except to say that it does not seem to be quite fair in its implied statement as to the object of British foreign policy in the past. I pass, therefore, to the second or constructive part of the programme, in which the Foreign Office, and the British democracy whose servant it is, is advised as to what it ought to do. The formula then runs as follows :—

"The foreign policy of Great Britain shall be directed to concerted action between the Powers and the setting up of an International Council whose deliberations and decisions shall be made public, with such machinery for securing international agreement as shall be the 'guarantee of an abiding peace.'"

There is nothing much to be said about the proposal for concerted action between the Powers. There is nothing new about it. The Great Powers of Europe have constantly throughout the last hundred years acted together in matters of common concern, especially in Near Eastern questions, and no State has a better record for loyalty and persistence in this direction than Great Britain. But the Concert has never created any organisation for itself beyond temporary conferences and congresses of ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, and it has never shown itself amenable to democratic control. The important part of the suggestion lies in the proposed International Council.

If this suggestion is intended to be practicable it presumably means an *inter-State* Council—that is to say, a council composed of nominees from all the States or all the leading States of the world. A real *International* Council in which Poles sat next to Russians and Armenians next to Turks can hardly have been intended. Presumably also the council is to consist of persons nominated by their governments or according to arrangements made

by each separate government, and not directly or on a uniform plan by the citizens of the States concerned. It will be a conference of governments with governments, or of superior persons with superior persons, like the British Imperial Conference which meets every four years. Again, there is nothing particularly novel in the suggestion. The two Hague Conferences have been gatherings of this nature, and their deliberations, like those of our Imperial Conference, have been made public. If our foreign policy is to be directed to getting together a deliberate body consisting of representatives from the leading States of the world, that aim can be quickly attained.

But the real crux of the formula lies in the word 'decisions.' In what sense is this council going to *decide* things? Are they going merely to make up their own minds and embody the results in a series of resolutions? Or are they going to legislate? In other words, are they going to be an assembly of envoys or an assembly of representatives, in other words a Parliament? If the former, I welcome the suggestion. The more discussion and interchange and sifting of views we can have between public men in different States the better. But I see in such a suggestion no 'guarantee of an abiding peace.' The reason why many well-meaning people grow enthusiastic over the idea of such a council is that they look to it as the machinery which will prevent conflicts between States. A body of this character may help to make war less likely; or, by revealing a deep gulf of principle between two sets of members, it may (like the second Hague Congress) make it more likely; but it cannot make war impossible. So far as machinery is concerned, it could only do so if it had an executive responsible to it and obliged to obey its orders; and if it had armed forces to carry out those orders, backed up by a federal treasury and a federal system of taxation; if it could quench a smouldering war in Germany or the Balkans as the Home Secretary can quench a riot at Tonypandy. In other words, an International Council can only be effective as *an organ of government* if it is part of a World-Government acting according to a regular written constitution: and such a constitution could only be set going after it had been adopted by a convention representative of all the peoples or governments concerned. Before the suggested council could have authority to *decide* things, in the sense in which the formula suggests, Frenchmen, Germans, Turks, Russians and citizens of other existing States must have declared their willingness to merge their statehood in a larger whole and to hand over their armed forces, or the greater part of them, to the new central government. This may be what the formula means. It may be intended to allow a government of Germans, Magyars, Russians, Turks or any other chance majority to use the British and French navies to carry out

its purposes. If this is meant it should be said. If it is not meant it should be explained that the council proposed is not an organ of government but an organ of influence or advice, and it should be made quite clear, to forestall inevitable disillusionments, that, to quote Washington again, "Influence is not government." Such a body might be of very great service to mankind, both as a clearing-house of ideas and as a means for embodying agreed solutions into a practical shape. It might become at once a drafting body and an organ for giving expression to the growing unity of civilized public opinion. If it met regularly, and the world became accustomed to look to it for guidance, it might achieve more in both these directions than has been attained along this road hitherto. But it will not be a government. In matters of law and government there is no room for middle paths or soothing formulæ. Two States are either Sovereign or they are United or Federated : they cannot be half and half. A man must know of what State he is a citizen and to what authority his duty is due. We all have our duty to render to Caesar : but we cannot serve two Cæsars at once. Not all the Parliamentary ingenuity in the world can overcome that dilemma, as Virginians found out to their cost when the inexorable question was put to them at the outbreak of the Civil War. To ask British electors to surrender their power of determining the policy of this country to a body over which they have no control is to plunge into a jungle of difficulties and incidentally to set back, perhaps for ever, the cause of free and responsible government for which the Western Powers are trustees.

The practical programme of the Union of Democratic Control and of other advocates of similar solutions thus turns out to be something of an illusion. What is practical of the suggested machinery is not new, though it is susceptible of fuller and more systematic use than in the past : and what is new is neither practical nor wholesome—or, at least, would not be regarded as such by most Englishmen if its real meaning were made clear. War cannot be abolished by inventing foolproof political machinery, for no political machinery can impose ultimate irreconcilable differences of political principle. Political intercourse, like trade relations, may strengthen existing ties and deepen the attachment to common ideals, but it cannot create agreement where a common basis of agreement is not forthcoming. It is well for us to face the fact that there is no short cut to universal peace. War will only become obsolete after far-reaching changes have taken place in the mind and heart of the civilized peoples : and the first and perhaps most important step in that direction is that the civilized peoples should feel called upon to exercise a responsible control over their own governments and armed forces. It is useless to dream of

making Europe a federated Commonwealth till the separate units of the potential Federation are themselves Commonwealths. Interpreted as a call to the fuller exercise of responsible citizenship, every believer in free government will respond to the watchword of Democratic Control.

Let us say farewell then, once and for all, to this idea of an 'International Council' as providing machinery which shall be an absolute guarantee against war. But before passing on it is worth while spending a parting shot on a phrase with which it is often associated, because it illustrates a typical confusion of thought—I mean the phrase—the United States of Europe. The constant use of this phrase shows how easily such confusions gain vogue. One can see how it originated. America is a Continent. Europe is a Continent. America has its United States. Why should not the States of Europe unite and so put an end to European wars. It is not an unnatural train of reasoning for a Western American who knows nothing of Europe or of the causes which tend to produce wars. It escapes his notice that he is using the word 'State' in two different senses. State in the word United States means province. The separate States are provinces, or component members of a Federation. The word State was put into the American Constitution as a deliberate misnomer, in order to gratify the thirteen original Sovereign States when they abandoned their sovereignty in entering into the Federation. Similarly the Orange Free State retains its old name in the South African Union. The survival of the word cost the American Commonwealth dear, for the word enshrined, and rightly enshrined, a conception of citizenship and indefeasible loyalty: and it cost the Americans four years of war and a million lives before the confusion inherent in the word 'United States' was cleared up and men knew for certain whether the American Commonwealth was one State or several. That is the price men pay for halting confusedly between two opinions and trying to serve two Caesars at once. They not only failed to avert war, but actually promoted it.

I pass now to deal with an objection which must have been in some people's minds when I drew the distinction between Statehood and Nationality. It is quite true, they will say, that Statehood and Nationality are in fact, in the present condition of the world, distinguishable and often distinct—that Finland is a nation but part of the Russian State, and so on—but this is an unsatisfactory condition of things which it should be our hope to abolish. States and nations ought, they will say, to be coterminous. All States, or at any rate most States, ought to be Nation-States: at the very least, all self-governing States ought to be Nation-States. And they will invoke the authority of John Stuart Mill, whose words on the subject in his book on "Representative Government," have

passed almost unchallenged for two generations as the pure milk of Liberal doctrine. "It is," says Mill, "in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities."

This theory that the Nation-State is the normal and proper area of government at which believers in free institutions should aim, is sometimes known as 'the principle of Nationality': and many loose-thinking people believe that it is one of the causes for which we are fighting in the present war. My own view is exactly the contrary. I believe it is one of the most formidable and sinister forces on the side of our enemies and one of the chief obstacles to human progress at the present time.

Let us look into it more closely. What exactly does this belief in the coincidence of Nationality and Statehood mean? What is the principle underlying the theory of the National State, or of political nationalism, as it is sometimes called? The theory says that because the Poles feel themselves to be a nation, there ought to be an independent Poland. In other words, the independent Polish kingdom will rest upon the fact that its citizens are Poles. The Polish kingdom will be a kingdom of Poles. Polishness would be its distinguishing mark: the criterion of its citizenship. Districts of the territory or sections of the population which were not Polish, or had ceased to be Polish, would therefore cease to be 'national': and by ceasing to be national would lose their right to membership in the State. In other words, the State is not based on any universal principle, such as justice, or democracy, or collective consent, or on anything moral or universally human at all, but on something partial, arbitrary and accidental. "By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, this principle reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the State's boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence. According, therefore, to the degree of humanity and civilization in that dominant body which claims all the rights of the community, the inferior races are exterminated, or reduced to servitude, or outlawed, or put in a condition of dependence."

These last three sentences are not my own. They were not written to point the moral of the exterminations promoted by Turkish nationalism in Armenia, or of the various degrees of servitude, oppression and propaganda enforced by German, Magyar, Russian and other dominant forms of political nationalism? They were written by Lord Acton fifty years ago, when the Nationalist doctrines which overshadow Eastern Europe and Western Asia to-day were a cloud no bigger than a man's hand.

In his essay on "Nationality," published in 1862,¹ Acton remorselessly analysed its political claims and predicted, with the insight of moral genius, the disastrous consequences of basing government on so arbitrary and insecure a foundation. "The theory of Nationality," he said, using the strongest language at his command, "is more absurd and more criminal than the theory of Socialism." Time softens the edge of strong language, but in this case without blunting the force of the prediction. "Its course," he says, "will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehensive, more subversive, or more arbitrary than this. It is a confutation of democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popular will, and substitutes for it a higher principle. . . . Thus, after surrendering the individual to the collective will, the revolutionary system (Acton has been speaking of the theory of Nationality as a phase of revolutionary doctrine) makes the collective will subject to conditions which are independent of it, only to be controlled by an accident."

Lord Acton's words were not listened to, for more fashionable doctrines held the field. In England both Liberalism and Conservatism had their own special reasons for espousing the cause of political Nationalism. To the Liberals it seemed to spell liberty, and to the Conservatives it seemed to embody the force of instinct or tradition, as against doctrines which based government on more universal considerations of Reason and Humanity. But Acton, with his eye ranging over the whole course of human history, cared more for liberty than for any of the temporary formulae in which it was sought to dress her up. He foresaw that to base government on anything less than a quality common to all the governed, in virtue of their common humanity, was for the State to surrender its moral pretensions and its rôle as a factor in the moral progress of the world. Time has borne him out: and what was in its inception little more than a pardonable aberration, a natural result of strong feeling combined with loose thinking, has become in more than one contemporary State the mainspring of a Realpolitik which avowedly bases policy upon considerations of national selfishness and seeks to propagate a dominant nationalism through the power of the government with which it is so unhappily associated.

Am I out of sympathy then, I shall be asked, with political nationalist movements? Do I look coldly on the record of Mazzini and Garibaldi, or regret the Union of Italy? Far from it. But I wish to make perfectly clear—what was too easily obscured by the

1. Republished in "The History of Freedom and other Essays," 1909.

circumstances of the time—that the reason why the people of Sicily, Venetia and other parts of Italy became incorporated with Piedmont in one Italian State was not because they were Italian, but because they deliberately desired thus to dispose of their destiny. Italian national sentiment might, and in fact did, contribute to promote that desire: but it was not the principle underlying the union of Italy. If it had been, there would have been many islands or enclaves in the new Italian kingdom. The sentiment of Nationality may, and often does, contribute to what is called irredentism, but it is not a justifiable basis of the irredentists' claim to a change of government. One can see that at a glance by considering what would happen if the sentiment of Nationality *were* admitted as a sole and sufficient claim for a change of government. French Canada would have to pass to France, Wisconsin to Germany, and part of Minnesota to Norway, while the New York police would become the servants of the new Home Rule government in Ireland. I have taken progressively impossible instances in order to show how easily the theory which makes national feeling the criterion of Statehood can be reduced to an absurdity. But the fact that the theory is absurd does not prevent its being put into practice, and instances as absurd as those last drawn from the New World can be drawn in actual fact from the Old. To what State ought Macedonia to belong? It depends, according to the political nationalist's theory, on the nationality of the people of Macedonia. Magicians are brought upon the scene, in the shape of ethnologists and historians, to determine the question of nationality, and the unfortunate people, instead of being asked what they do desire, are told what they ought to desire, and schools are founded to enforce the lesson. Some friends of mine stayed some years ago in a village which changed its nationality more than once in a season under the persuasion of the bayonets of rival bands of wandering propagandists. Nationality has in fact become a matter of propaganda, like religion, and the wars that it leads to partake of the aimless and blundering brutality of religious wars, in which men try to save other men's souls by offering them the alternatives of conversion or the stake.

It is not the principle of nationality, as so many English people think, which will bring peace and good government to Macedonia and Eastern Europe generally, but the principle of toleration. It took Western Europe several generations after the Thirty Years War to discover that religion, being subjective, was no satisfactory criterion of Statehood and that a wise ruler must allow his subjects to go to Heaven by their own road. It may take Eastern Europe as long to reach the same conclusion about Nationality. But in the long run the theory of a National State will go the way of Henry VIII's and Luther's theory of a National Church.

In reality, of course, English people when they invoke the principle of Nationality mean the principle of Democracy—the principle that a people, however constituted, whether homogeneous like the Italians, or closely related like the Southern Slavs, or not homogeneous at all, like the Belgians and the Swiss, has a right to dispose of its own destiny. If we mean Democracy, let us boldly say so. It is no cause to be ashamed of.

Having thus cleared the ground, I will proceed to indicate my own view of Nationality and Statehood. I must be very brief; but, if I give little more than definitions, I hope my criticism of other views will have enabled the definitions to explain themselves.

It is clear that there is a fundamental difference between the two conceptions. Nationality, like religion, is subjective; Statehood is objective. Nationality is psychological; Statehood is political. Nationality is a condition of mind; Statehood is a condition in law. Nationality is a spiritual possession; Statehood is an enforceable obligation. Nationality is a way of feeling, thinking and living; Statehood is a condition inseparable from all civilized ways of living.

What is subjective cannot be defined in strict scientific terms: it can only be interpreted; and the interpretation will only have a meaning for those who can appreciate the peculiar quality of the object interpreted. It is impossible to define the quality of a Beethoven symphony so as to make it intelligible to non-musicians. Similarly it is impossible to define the quality which makes Shakespeare's work characteristically English, or to explain to a German ignorant of England what exactly it is which has evaporated in Schlegel's translation. Jews and Gentiles both rock equally with laughter at "Potash and Perlmutter"; but the Jews know that they are laughing at the real Jewish humour of the play, while the Gentiles are only laughing at the jokes. Internationalism, in its finest and truest sense, involves an insight into the inner spiritual life of many nationalities and a sensitive palate to many various forms of national quality. A man who has no understanding of Jewish humour may have the highest liberal principles and the best and most enlightened intentions; but he will have an incomplete understanding of Jewish nationality.

How then shall we define Nationality? Nationality, I would suggest, is a form of corporate sentiment. I would define a nation as *a body of people united by a corporate sentiment of peculiar intensity, intimacy and dignity, related to a definite home-country*. Every nation has a home, though some nations, such as the Jews, the Irish, the Norwegians and the Poles, live for the greater part in exile. If the Jews ceased to feel a peculiar affection for Palestine or the Irish for Ireland they would both cease to be nations, as the gipsies have ceased to be a nation; and when an individual Jew

ceases to feel affection for Palestine or an individual Irishman ceases to feel affection for Ireland, he ceases to be a Jew or an Irishman.¹ Once an American citizen, a man is always an American citizen until either the State is destroyed or his status is altered by process of law; but Nationality, being subjective, is often mutable and intermittent. History is full of the deaths and resurrections of nations, and amid the commercialism and cosmopolitanism of to-day many diverse forms of national consciousness are struggling to maintain their hold on the minds and spirits of the scattered races of mankind. Only those who have seen at close quarters what a moral degradation the loss of nationality involves, or sampled the drab cosmopolitanism of Levantine seaports or American industrial centres, can realise what a vast reservoir of spiritual power is lying ready, in the form of national feeling, to the hands of teachers and statesmen, if only they can learn to direct it to wise and liberal ends. To seek to ignore this force or to humiliate it or to stamp it out in the name of progress or western ideas is unwittingly to reproduce Prussian methods and to promote, not progress or enlightenment, but spiritual impoverishment and moral weakness. Driven from the throne and the altar, national sentiment is at last finding its proper resting place in the mission school and the settlement and in the homes of the common people. In the world as it is to-day, as educated India is discovering, consciousness of nationality is essential to individual self-respect, as self-respect is essential to right living.

Nationality, in fact, rightly regarded, is not a political but an educational conception. It is a safeguard of self-respect against the insidious onslaughts of a materialistic cosmopolitanism. It is the sling in the hands of weak undeveloped peoples against the Goliath of material progress. The political Prussianism of a

1. It may be argued that such men still remained members of their race even though they no longer acknowledged their nationality. This is true. Race is an objective test, and no man can change his race any more than a leopard can change his spots. But this is not the same as to admit that there is such a thing as a Jewish or an Irish race. Race is an ethnological and anthropological term and much confusion would be avoided if it were kept severely out of political discussions. The current scientific classifications of race (*homo Alpinus*, *homo Mediterraneus*, etc.) have no bearing on questions of national or political consciousness, except to make it clear that political theories (like that of Houston Stewart Chamberlain) which base themselves on race differences are unscientific and worthless. The world is, of course, full of the descendants of 'assimilated' Jews and Irishmen; but it is equally full of 'assimilated' Assyrians, Hittites, Goths, Picts, Angles, and other forgotten nationalities. To lay stress on facts such as these is no more helpful than to recall that we are all children of Adam.

militarist government is far less dangerous to the spiritual welfare of its subjects in the long run than the ruthless and pervading pressure of commercial and cosmopolitan standards. What is imposed on them by overt tyranny men resist, and win self-respect by resisting; but the corruption that creeps in as an 'improvement' men imitate and succumb to. The vice of nationalism is Jingoism, and there are always good Liberals amongst us ready to point a warning finger against its manifestations. The vice of internationalism is decadence and the complete eclipse of personality, ending in a type of character and social life which good Conservatives instinctively detest, but have seldom sufficient patience to describe. Fortunately we possess in Sir Mark Sykes a political writer who has the gift of clothing his aversions in picturesque descriptive writing, and in his books on the Near East English readers can find some of the best examples (which might be paralleled from other Continents, not least from America) of the spiritual degradation which befalls men who have pursued 'Progress' and cosmopolitanism and lost contact with their own national spiritual heritage. Here is his account of one such mis-educated mind, encountered in Kurdistan: "He said he was studying to be an ethnologist, psychologist, hypnotist and poet: he admired Renan, Kant, Herbert Spencer, Gladstone, Spurgeon, Nietzsche and Shakespeare. It afterwards appeared that his library consisted of an advertisement of Eno's Fruit Salt, from which he quoted freely. He wept over what he called the 'punishment of our great nation' and desired to be informed how, in existing circumstances, he could elevate himself to greatness and power."¹ Most of us, who have been teachers, have known the *genus* 'prig' in our time and have discovered how to handle him; but it is not so easy to discover how to handle a whole society of prigs from which the health-giving winds of nationality and tradition have been withdrawn. No task is more urgent among the backward and weaker peoples than the wise fostering of nationality and the maintenance of national traditions and corporate life as a school of character and self-respect.

But to return to the definition. National sentiment is *intense*: it makes a great deal of difference to a man whether or not he is a Scot or a Jew or a Pole. It is not a thing which he could deny or betray without a feeling of shame. It is *intimate*: it goes very deep down to the roots of a man's being: it is linked up with his past: it embodies the momentum of an ancient tradition. The older a nation is and the more it has achieved and suffered, the more national it is. Nationality means more to a Jew and an Armenian (probably the two oldest surviving forms of national consciousness) than to a Canadian; and, to quote a famous phrase, "it means more to be a Canadian to-day" than it did before the

1. "The Caliph's Last Heritage," 1915, p. 429.

second Battle of Ypres. Thirdly, it is *dignified*. The corporate sentiment of a nation is of a more dignified order than the corporate sentiment of a village. It is as hard to say at what stage of size or dignity nationality begins as to say how many grains are needed to form a heap. One could go through the islands of the world, from a coral-reef to Australia, and find it impossible to say at what point one reached an island large enough for the common sentiment of its inhabitants to be described as national. Broadly speaking, one can only say that if a people feels itself to be a nation, it is a nation.

Let us follow out what follows from this definition. If a group of people have a corporate sentiment, they will seek to embody it in a common or similar mode of life. They will have their own national institutions. Englishmen will make toast and play open air games and smoke short pipes and speak English wherever they go. Similarly Greeks will speak Greek and eat olives (if they can get them) and make a living by their wits. There is nothing in all this to prevent Englishmen and Greeks from being good citizens under any government to whose territory they migrate. The difficulty only arises when governments are foolish or intolerant enough to prohibit toast or olives or football or national schools and societies, or to close the avenues of professional life and social progress to new classes of citizens. Arbitrary government, by repressing the spontaneous manifestations of nationality, lures it into political channels : for it is only through political activity that oppressed nationalities can gain the right to pursue their distinctive ways of life. Between free government and nationality there is no need, and indeed hardly a possibility, of conflict. This is clear from the fact that, whereas in reactionary States, the social manifestations of nationality invariably tend to become political, so that literary societies and gymnastic clubs are suspect to the police and constantly liable to dissolution, in Great Britain and America manifestations of nationality tend to become more and more non-political and social in character. Languages banned and prohibited in Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia as dangerous to the State are freely spoken in the United States : and, though there are more Poles in Chicago than in Warsaw, and more Norwegians in the North Western States than in Norway, nobody apprehends any danger therefrom to the unity and security of the American Commonwealth. The American Commonwealth may, and indeed must, change its distinctive character and quality with the lapse of time and the change in the composition of its population ; it may even become multi-lingual. But its governmental institutions will remain untroubled, so long as it remains a free democracy, by political nationalist movements. America will have to wait long for its Kossuths and Garibaldis.

Much more could be said about Nationality; but it is time to pass to Statehood.

What is a State? A State can be defined, in legal language, as a territory or territories over which there is a government claiming unlimited authority. This definition says nothing about the vexed question of the relation between the State and the individual, and the rights of conscientious objectors. It only makes clear the indisputable fact that, whatever the response of individuals, the claim to exercise unlimited authority is inherent in Statehood. It is involved in State sovereignty. The State, as Aristotle said long ago, is a sovereign association, embracing and superseding, for the purposes of human life in society, all other associations. The justification of the State's claim to peculiar authority is that experience shows it is mankind's only safeguard against anarchy and that anarchy involves the eclipse of freedom. Haiti and Mexico to-day are the best commentaries on that well-thumbed text, of which priests and barons in earlier ages, like Quakers and plutocrats and syndicalists in our own, have needed and still need to be reminded. Freedom and the good life cannot exist without government. They can only come into existence through government.

But Statehood in itself does not carry us beyond ancient Egypt and Assyria, or beyond Petrograd and Potsdam. Such States have subjects, and these subjects have obligations, both legal and moral: but they are not, strictly speaking, citizens. Citizenship is the obligation incumbent on members of Commonwealths or free States.

What is a free State? Here again one can give no exact definition; for freedom, like nationality, is not something tangible, like a ballot-box, but a state of mind in individual men and women. A free State is a State so governed as to promote freedom. What is freedom? Perhaps the best brief definition of freedom is that lately given by that bold psychologist, our chairman, when he spoke of that continuous possibility of initiative which we vaguely mean by 'freedom.'¹ A man is not free unless he feels free, and in order to feel free he must feel that there is a full range of thought and at least some range of action left open for the determination of his own will. How strong that desire for personal freedom, that sense of the importance of the possibility of initiative, is among Englishmen we have lately seen by their marked preference for being 'asked' to enlist as against being 'ordered' to enlist. For Englishmen, in fact, and for all men who set store by human values, the sense of personal freedom is an important factor in promoting happiness or a sense of well-being. Freedom may be

¹. Article on "The New Statesman," Sept. 25, 1915.

hard to define in set terms: but the man who can be perfectly happy without it enjoys the passive contentment of an animal rather than the positive well-being proper to a man. The neglect of this obvious truth in the working of our industrial government is the simplest and most potent element in the inarticulate labour unrest which has so much hampered British trade and industry of recent years. Harmony can only be restored by frankly basing our industrial life, as our political life is already based, on the principle of responsible self-government.

Freedom and self-government, as this illustration shows, are closely associated: but it is important to recognize that they are not identical. Haiti is more self-governing than its neighbour Jamaica or Nigeria, but Jamaica and Nigeria are the freer countries. If British rule and its accompanying expert knowledge were withdrawn from Nigeria and the country were in consequence ravaged by sleeping sickness, the individual Nigerian would obviously not thereby have increased his freedom of initiative or his personal well-being. At certain stages of knowledge and education free government and responsible self-government are incompatible; but it is the root principle of democracy that the right, or rather the moral duty, of self-government is an essential element in full personal freedom. No State can be described as free unless it is either self-governing or so organised as to promote self-government in the future.

If the exercise of self-government is a duty and a privilege without which man cannot grow to his full moral stature or enjoy the full sense of freedom and self-respect, it follows that the object to which it is directed is a moral object. Citizenship is more than a mere matter of political gymnastics, designed to train the moral faculties of the individual: it is civilized man's appointed means for the service of mankind. It is through the State, and by means of civic service, that man in the modern world can best do his duty to his neighbour. An ordinary old-fashioned State may be no more than a Sovereign Authority, but a free State or Commonwealth is and must be invested with what may best be described as a moral personality. It could not claim the free service of its citizens unless it stood for moral ends. In so far as it ceases to stand for moral ends, its citizens cease to be moral agents, and, as we have seen in the case of Germany, this inevitable atrophy of moral action in its citizens means a corresponding decline in their moral freedom. Their sense of civic obligation comes into conflict with their sense of what is right and just, and the conflict ends in a degradation of personal self-respect and in the open acceptance of a two-fold standard of morality for States and for private individuals, resulting in the approbation of what is known as

Realpolitik. If the unashamed Italian ministerial phrase, "Sacro egoismo nazionale" (sacred national egoism), which could be paralleled nearer home, really characterized the guiding motive of the Italian State, as it does that of some others, then the people of Italy would not only be less moral but also less free and self-respecting to-day than they were when they responded to the very different watchwords of Mazzini.

To maintain and to live up to this high conception of citizenship is no easy task. A great political tradition embodies the work of generations of effort and service. Those who lightly ask us to transcend it and become citizens of Europe or of a World-State have often not made clear to themselves what civic obligation involves, or how necessary it is that, before we ask Europe to accept us as citizens, we must have been faithful in small things, so as to bring her a gift of service worthy of her acceptance. Membership of a free State, such as the British Commonwealth, means more than mere obedience to its laws or a mere emotion of pride and patriotism, more even than an intelligent exercise of political duties: it involves a personal dedication to great tasks and great ideals: it links a man to great causes striven for in the past and sets him a standard and a tradition to work for in the future. The functions of government may conceivably be divided; but dedication, like marriage, must of its nature be undivided. It can only be relinquished when it can be merged in all solemnity and in the fulness of time in a great free federation where the same causes and ideals can be brought to larger and happier fulfilment.

There is no time, at the end of this long paper, to work out a philosophy of government in detail, but this at least may be said to make clear my attitude to the inter-State problem which in my earlier remarks I have laid bare rather than attempted to solve. That problem is incapable of solution till men have come to regard States as moral personalities with duties as well as rights: till all the leading States, through the public opinion of their free citizens, have come to regard their duty to humanity as prior to the safeguarding of their selfish purposes: and until there is a far closer agreement among the civilized peoples than seems possible to-day as to the principles which should underlie the ultimate organisation of the world on the basis of morality and justice. Government exists to promote the conditions of a good life: and the anarchy and wickedness of the present conflict are a revelation at once of the absence and of the need of a world-government which shall promote those conditions for all mankind. But until mankind are agreed as to those conditions, until they know what kind of a world they desire to live in, and have achieved freedom of action to give effect to their wishes, it is idle to look to statesmen to give us more than

a temporary and precarious peace. Peace is not the birthright of the sons of men: it is the prize of right living. Let us first be clear in our minds and hearts as to what is the cause for which we stand and where our service is due, and let us be faithful in performing it: then haply, at the latter end, when the reign of Justice and Liberty has been assured, Peace too may be added unto us.

A. E. ZIMMERN.

THE ATLANTIC NATIONS AND CONTINENTALISM.¹

I.

THE carrying power of water is clearly connected with the origin of civilization. The sluggish streams of Egypt and Mesopotamia, and the great rivers of China, did something more than irrigate the lands they flowed through. They were natural highways which fostered commerce and the localization of industries, and which ultimately became the parents of written laws. There is a pregnant contrast between the beneficent, humane and law-regulated civilization of Babylon about 2000 B.C., located as it was on the lower waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the martial, aggressive and predatory offspring of that civilization, Assyria, situated amongst the unnavigable mountain streams.

The early civilization of Crete was born, like Aphrodite, from the sea. Homer represents Zeus himself as supporting the Greeks of 'the high-prowed ships,' while Athene (who most significantly overwhelms Ares in single combat) is the inspirer of the seafaring Odysseus. Later it was Athens, the sea-power, that attained unsurpassed heights of intellectual and artistic genius; while the inland Sparta, who trampled her down, is remembered for little besides her military virtues and organization. Carthage is seen by us only through Roman eyes. But it may well be that the world has seen no greater disaster than the annihilation of this maritime power. For, though we are ourselves committed to the Roman civilization that actually prevailed, it does not follow that it was the best.

But the struggle between Behemoth and Leviathan did not end with the triumph of Rome. The sea ever remains, and gives birth, age after age, to a culture essentially contrasted with the military and continental type. Had the Hanse towns of the Middle Ages succeeded, as they came near doing, in dominating the nations of Northern Europe, it is conceivable that the Thirty Years' War might have had other issue, and, with the complete defeat of the Hapsburgs, the opportunity might have opened for a commercial and federal type of state to prevail over Central Europe.

However that may be, it can scarcely be an accident that our sea-girt and sea-faring nation is the one great European power that

1. A paper read before the Social Psychological Group of the Sociological Society, November 11, 1915.

has never aped the titles and insignia of Imperial Rome. Our kings have never worn the iron crown, like Charlemagne or Napoleon; they have never called themselves Cæsars or Czars, like the Hapsburgs, the Hohenzollerns and the Romanoffs; they have never adopted the Legionary Eagle as their national emblem, like Austria, Germany, Russia, Napoleonic France, and even republican America. Nor have we, as a nation, gone out of set purpose to build ourselves an empire, since the time when our French-speaking kings contended for dominion in France; rather, we may say that, "in a fit of absence of mind," our enterprising commerce has created those scattered allegiances to the British Crown, which, we find with some surprise, now figure as an "empire over-seas." But, whether we consider it historically or psychologically, it is an empire in a different sense, and of a different type, from any former empire; and it is worth while to rehearse certain characteristic features, which justify us in regarding it as comparable to an organism, rather than to an organization: a living growth, than a creation of military might.

(1) The allegiance of our English-speaking colonies is practically optional, and even their contribution to the defences of the Empire is entirely voluntary.

(2) The highest alien races, such as the French and the Dutch, are able, without ever becoming anglicized, to join with us, as enthusiastic members of our empire.

(3) Natives of various races far removed from our own are employed in the guardianship of their own states. Unlike other empires, ancient and modern, we do not habitually draft, say, Indian troops to guard our African possessions, taking Egyptians or Bantus to guard India. India is policed and garrisoned by Indians, superintended by a very small handful of English civilians and soldiers; and Egypt by Egyptians.

(4) The principle of "letting alone" has been widely followed, with three typical results:

- (a) We have native states, largely independent, bedded in our empire;
- (b) We have protectorates, such as Egypt, in which native princes retain their titles undisturbed, and in which even the suzerainty of the Turkish Empire was acknowledged until that power chose to fight us;
- (c) Though we have for a century enjoyed a paramount power on the sea, we have not laid hands on the colonies of weak but civilized states, like Holland, Denmark and Portugal, even when to do so might have saved us great expenditure of wealth and lives.

Of many of these characteristics we have no monopoly, but in their sum they are unique.

The accident of our position partly accounts for them, but they are also attributable to something in our psychology. As long ago as Alfred the Great we see the same principles at work in the way he drew together the different realms of the island. Having defeated the Dane he did not crush him, but established him in possession of a territory equal to his own. All the rest of the island gradually drew into his polity of its own will. Where he conquered he preserved and improved the local administration, and his wise policy was followed and carried to a final conclusion by his son, his daughter, and three grandsons after him. Even our island was thus first united in the spirit of confederacy rather than of empire, and it is this spirit which has gone forth to found our dominions over the world.

Our rule is therefore to be regarded as specifically different in spirit and origin from the empires of the Caesars, Napoleons, Hapsburgs or Hohenzollerns. And the purpose of the present paper is to show that it is the type of a certain civic culture, or stage of advance, which we shall find exemplified also in parts of the earth owing no fealty to our crown (though to a greater or less extent under our influence), and which is destined to play a still greater part in the future history of civilization.

The following observations and conclusions are the result of a recent journey to America and four European neutrals, and subsequently to France and Russia. This journey was undertaken by the writer with a definite purpose which need not be described here. It will be sufficient to say that it was a private political venture, subsequently approved by our own Foreign Office. By leading to interviews with the Foreign Ministers and with public men of the first rank it brought together a number of impressions of national sentiment of great interest, at all events to the writer, and their incidental character perhaps rather enhances their value. I saw, not what I went to see, but what I could not help seeing. I also found a certain value in the fact that my journey led me to make America and not England the starting-point for a tour in Europe. The tendency to contrast the countries visited with one another and with America, rather than only with one's own land, made one more sensitive to those subtle differences of psychology in European countries which are significant of the cultural trends in modern civilization. And the consequent theory of the present conflict as the clash of two opposite principles of political consolidation active everywhere in different degrees, was the result of a later attempt to explain many things that had at first led to perplexity or surprise. In a paper such as this I must necessarily select my observations to exemplify my theory, but it need hardly be said that the theory was, in the first place, an attempt to explain my observations.

II.

After a wintry ten days on the grey Atlantic desert, to see the broken, rocky coast and picturesque hills of New York Harbour, and then the towering metropolis itself thrust out amongst them, is to be overwhelmed with a sense of exuberant achievement. The race that could resolutely settle that bleak and distant coast; could make itself at home and claim its independent maturity; and, in the course of years, could erect a city compared with which all other cities appear creeping, timid things—this surely is a race that bears enormous testimony to the power of the children of the sea. It is easy to deprecate mere size, but to think of the New York skyscrapers as merely big is to lack imagination. As an engineering feat alone they are by no means contemptible, but they are also, like all unique achievements, interpretive of the land that begets them. Those twenty, forty, and fifty storied giants, crowned with bronze cornices or metal domes, and made brilliant at night by ten thousand lights and farflung flares, are eloquent, not only of wealth and skill, but of the whole American psychology.

Here is a people filled with the sense that “all things are possible.” When the slender tongue of Manhattan Island could no longer hold the business and financial centre of a metropolis whose heart-beats must reach across the Atlantic to Europe, and across the continent to the Pacific, the Americans, as they could not build to east or west or south, built upwards, ten stories, twenty stories, fifty stories, until in the centre of the busiest city on earth there are thousands of offices high up amongst the clouds and winds that blow straight from the sea and hills. And while the dust, the din, the stench and the flies are left far below, the city is reached in a period measured by seconds rather than minutes.

The factors which produced this result are of course many, but above all and embracing all is the fact that the Americans were free from the countless inhibitions which check the vigour of older peoples. Amongst these inhibitions is the dread of injury to one's neighbour, or, to be frank, the dread of being injured by one's more enterprising neighbour. The immediate effect of the erection of a sky-scraper is to darken the windows of all lower buildings within range, but this is a challenge to other buildings to rise too, and acts less detrimentally than might appear, even to the laggards. The shadow of an object is deepest at its foot, and the higher it rises the more the luminous quality of the atmosphere dissipates it, with the result that a building of fifty stories casts scarcely a denser shade than one of ten. The streets of New York city are not perceptibly darker than those of the city of London, and though some of the

lower stories are comparatively dark, the high upper stories of those same buildings are bathed in light. Moreover, the amount of window light per acre is of course vastly increased, so that, owing to a certain lack of social restraint, the Americans have achieved an immense social benefit.

The same principle is capable of a wide application. Trade unionism, for instance (including the corresponding institutions of lawyers, doctors, etc.), has as one of its objects the limitation of the supply of skilled labour and ultimately of output, and is of the same nature as the law of ancient lights. Our real problem in either case is not to keep down our neighbour, but to get up ourselves, and we must discover how to keep the good of unionism and such institutions, and yet apply them to their true purpose.

But with the strength of America, which is its intense individualism, go almost incredible defects. From the landing-stage one gets into a taxi and drives a mile or so to one's hotel, a mile liable to be well-nigh as rough and dangerous as the Atlantic itself. The abominable condition of the roads passes belief, and is such as only a nightly Zeppelin raid would make excusable. So incapable is this wonderful people of corporate action that, whereas there is no luxury or perfection of service which it cannot supply by private enterprise under the ground or up in the clouds, it is unable to keep those portions of the surface of mother earth which it entrusts to its public bodies in a condition which would do credit to the cities of Central Asia or Africa.

This characteristic, of daring flights of genius coupled with neglect of the most commonplace civic duties, is displayed in another way in the national politics. Take it for all in all, the United States Congress appears to be an even worse legislative body than those of Europe, and at times has certainly been more corrupt than most. But its shortcomings are in a fair way to be redeemed by that creation of the national genius, the American Presidency, an office which is the most popular and democratic institution in the world, and yet is the most powerful autocracy that a civilized people has begotten. In the hands of a man like Lincoln it becomes an engine of overwhelming power for good or ill, both for America and the whole world.

And this, too, is a realization of the possibilities of individualism. Every American boy grows up with the knowledge that no artificial or conventional barrier stands between him and the attainment of the highest office in the world. It fosters a type of character, individual, independent, emulous, and the fact that the United States has provided so remarkable a succession of men to fill the chair is in part due to the fact that the bent of the popular mind is turned towards the problem of qualifying for the position. But here again the pre-eminence of the single individual overshadows

the secondary offices of state, indeed of the state as a corporation at all, and there is, I imagine, comparatively little ambition among the most brilliant American youths to shine, in company with others, in the Cabinet or the highest branches of the services.

The American constitution, with its comparatively weak sense of corporate life, has produced an illogicality so amazing that it is little short of a miracle that it has survived. Some years ago, it will be remembered, America found herself very near war with Italy, arising out of the curious fact that the Central Government, which is the only power able to make treaties with foreign powers, is actually unable constitutionally to enforce their observance upon its component states. The United States are so individualistic, in short, that they are not a united state at all. A similar fact in a form only somewhat less startling exists with ourselves. The Imperial Parliament is responsible for the foreign policy of the empire. But it is well known to us that we are practically without power other than moral suasion wherewith to make our colonies conform.

It has been pointed out to me that this weakness of social organization in America does not involve a want of national coherence. The nexus is provided by the immense sociability of the individual. Every American, it is said, knows ten times as many of his fellow-citizens as we do, with the result that movements, opinions, and determinations are rapidly spread through the whole country. The corporate life is not therefore wanting, but has an individualist basis.

Nothing in my American visit puzzled me more at first than to find myself amongst a people of a sixth sense—at least that is the only way I know how to describe the American instinct for the financial aspect of things. Whatever kind of people I met—scholars, statesmen, philanthropists, journalists, theologians—it is scarcely too much to say that they never seemed quite sure that they understood my meaning until they had reduced my proposals, or ideas, to some form of financial statement or problem. In England one is inclined to feel injured if a university professor talks to one about the improvement of his estate when he ought to be describing the latest find in Crete, or the qualities of a new solar element. But just as every building must have a site, though the value of the erection does not depend upon the area, so every human endeavour is an edifice reared upon a basis of dollars, and the American realizes that to ignore this fact is to build castles in the air.

I have concluded that this characteristic is a further development of our insular psychology in one of its best features. Every Englishman conceives that he has not only a right, but an obligation, to hold his own views on political, medical, religious and military matters, as well as social, artistic and domestic ones.

Perhaps ultimately we have no more deep-seated difference with our German contemporaries than their readiness to leave high diplomatic, and therefore moral, questions unreservedly to their diplomatic and military authorities. We flatter ourselves that nothing would have led us to swallow unchallenged the military assertion that the invasion of Belgium was a necessary feature in their defence against Russia. However that may be, it is certain that our democracy has a fairly firm grasp of the great principle that experts and authorities exist to execute the will, that is, the moral and intellectual judgments, of the people, and in no case *vice versa*.

The American, then, extends this principle to finance. The management of the dollar is too vital a matter to be delegated to a class of people. Like the Nonconformist conscience, it is a responsibility which he dare not depute to another. So far as the individual is concerned, this point of view is worthy of all honour. But if it has as its counterpart the incredibly rotten finance of certain American public bodies, it is too dearly bought. One cannot believe that so keen and far-sighted a people will long endure this reproach.

Before leaving our consideration of America, it must be noted that, despite the many saliently individualistic qualities of her civilization, she fought one of the world's greatest wars to uphold the continental principle. If in many ways she holds her component states with a singularly weak leash, she resolved not to tolerate the presence on her borders of a rival power comparable to her own. Yet even this was from every point of view a war of liberty, and the great division of British sympathies in the matter was partly due to the claim of both sides that liberty was the principle for which they fought: the North for human and individual liberty; the South for local liberty, the liberty of every state to regulate its own action, and in the last resort to establish its own government.

As we sailed from New York on a dreary January afternoon, the great buildings were soon shrouded in mist, which hid all ill-assorted elements, and showed nothing but sombre towering masses. From a few miles distance these form themselves into two groups, the Woolworth building thrusting up like a great cathedral spire, and the rest, a little lower, grouping like a high-pitched nave. Long after dark I looked back from the ship's stern towards New York, and there clear above the horizon were the dim lights of the city sky-line, with one bright flare above them all.

What kind of splendour was I going to find in Europe: palaces, fortresses, churches, symbols of domination in this world, or of aspirations towards another too often founded in despair of this? And here in America, rising above the city squalor, are the business offices of men and women, constituting the nerve ganglia of a

commercial continent. At first, I confess, I was a little ashamed of being so much impressed by the overwhelming bigness of the New York sky-line, but one soon grows to be proud of it. These sky-scrappers are the brain-cells of a civilization bound together by a commerce-nexus that is, with all its shadier sides, essentially beneficent. Let them frankly glory in themselves as though here on Manhattan democratic civilization had at last dared to stand erect.

From New York I crossed direct to Bergen, in Norway, seeing nothing of my native islands but a few barren rocks in the Orkneys, and the tiny town of Kirkwall. What if that had been all there was? A Boston lady had given me a grievous shock before I left by soberly and earnestly expressing the sentiment that the poverty and degradation she had seen in English towns were so appalling that (having given birth to the United States) it were better that England were henceforth sunk in the sea. The sting of her sentence upon us was more than half removed by her naive belief that her own land was practically without poverty. But her words have, nevertheless, often haunted me. That it should be possible for an intelligent and cultivated visitor to our shores to think even for a moment that it would be a better and happier world if we were gone, like Sodom and Gomorrah, cannot but give one food for thought. Every nation judges itself by its aims, and its vision is prophetic; we judge one another by results, and our vision is photographic. Nor are these photographs usually recent. It takes years for the facts of a nation's life to come through into the common knowledge of other peoples. Abroad one finds an opportunity of seeing one's own country in the cold light of present or past performance, without the visionary gleam which blurs its darker features. And one finds opportunity to see other lands as living and growing things, instead of statistical aggregations, or as they appear depicted in humorous anecdote, and in the vision of some master who wrote ten, twenty, fifty years ago.

III.

The journey across Norway and Sweden to Stockholm is in some ways further psychologically than the voyage from New York to Bergen. The Norwegians are another of those wayward and erratic sea-peoples whom the continentals find so hard to comprehend.

The beauty and wonder of that mid-winter day on which we crossed the Scandinavian backbone were eloquent of the people bred amongst them. The Norwegians are a race at once casual and strenuous, friendly but uncommunicative, untidy yet permeated with artistic feeling in everything they produce, from roads and bridges to knives and spoons. That slender thread of line they

have built, and on which we crept that day along the precipitous sides of ice-bound lakes and fiords, past snow-shrouded villages, up into fairy valleys of frosted birch-trees, is a characteristic feat of Norwegian resolution. The crisp air was filled with brilliant sunshine, while the torrents below us could be heard growling under their chains. Slowly we wound our way high up amidst the glaciers and fog-hung rocks, and deep through barren summits in ten-mile tunnels, until the short day began to fail. This railway, built patiently year after year by a poor and scattered folk to connect two little towns about the size of, say, Devonport and Newcastle, across a thinly-peopled and sometimes entirely desert region of 300 miles, is in its way, amid circumstances so different, a demonstration of will-power and genius that need not fear comparison with the city on Manhattan.

When one enters Sweden, with her lakes and forests, her hills and rivers, one seems to have reached a land equally far from the Atlantic and from dreams of high emprise. Her ideal is smoothness, efficiency, scholarship, scientific method, leisure, not to say pleasure, and peaceful advance. The Swedes have everything that makes a nation great except transcendent genius, which is just what the Norwegians possess in so rare a degree. From a poor and scattered people, whose numbers are considerably less than half the population of greater London, have come in our own day not only explorers like Nansen and Amundsen, but immortal artists like Ibsen and Grieg. The Norwegian, adventurous and original, has given the world a new sport, with his peculiar snow-shoe; while the methodic Swede has given it a scientifically perfected system of physical drill. Sweden also originated the unheroic, but none the less admirable, Gothenburg system, and has recently made a further advance in the art of regulating, without abandoning, her national vice of drinking. In Stockholm the streets have recently been made respectable at nights by a system which neither England, nor Holland, nor France could imitate. Every man is obliged to carry with him a doctor's certificate defining the exact quantity of pure alcohol he may imbibe per diem, under severe penalties for exceeding this limit, imposed both on the purchaser and the vendor. And—strangest of all—it works!

The Swedes are a hospitable, generous-souled people, and a typical Swedish view of the War is that it is the tragedy of the Peloponnesian war repeated in Europe; the most civilized races of the earth strangling one another, to become the prey of a lower culture menacing them from the East. They see the fate of Belgium not without pity and grief, but they look nearer home at Finland—the land they once held and Europeanised—and ask, "Is it more cruel to fell a nation at a single blow than slowly to crush out its life for ever?" Amongst the intellectuals the general

expectation was doubtless at first that the Central Powers would ultimately prove the stronger,—the implicit faith in Germany's military machine leading to the expression of the view that the raising of Kitchener's Army was a tragic sacrifice of millions of helpless amateurs. Indeed, they seemed to look upon it much as we should if we heard of a new navy manned by clerks and bricklayers setting out to fight the British Grand Fleet.

It must not, however, be supposed that the country is solidly pro-German. Far otherwise. The working classes are mainly for England and France. The King is at least neutral. Many of the intellectuals see clearly the exaggerated nature of the Russian fear, and ardently advocate a rapprochement with England. But there can be little doubt that the majority of Swedes accept the arming of nations as in the order of nature, and the view is not uncommon that the British are guilty of a grave responsibility in having so long neglected to fill their place in the military scheme of Europe.

In Holland, which I next visited, a very different attitude prevails. The tragedy of to-day for the Hollander is not *this* war, as it is for the Swede, but the possibility of *any* war, and the appalling economic waste of even peace armaments. To realise the heroic pacifism of this small people one must read the diplomatic correspondence in the early stages of this war, on the subject of shipping, between the Dutch Foreign Office and those of England and Germany. At that time it was as impossible for England to defend Holland against Germany, as for Germany to defend her and her colonies against England. Yet, standing at the mercy of either of these two colossi, she corresponded first with one and then with the other, in a spirit of proud, not to say defiant, rectitude. In the full consciousness that within a space of ten days either of us might have reduced her historic cities to dust-heaps, or drenched her fertile flats in blood, she addressed us, both alike, as though principles of equity and international law were the only powers guiding the acts of nations, and as though no such thing existed as the difference between small powers and great.

It is well understood, however, that such an attitude can only remain permanently possible with the victory of the Allies, and the great majority of the Dutch look for this event with silent longing scarcely less ardent than our own. They believe that the security of their national existence is at stake, and in no country is the national sentiment more deep and passionate. The colonial empire which they have inherited from past centuries, but have now no navy to defend, is to them both a world of romance in itself, and the living memory of a glorious past. Nothing is more unthinkable than the quiet absorption of Holland by one of her great neighbours. Any attempt to engulf her would be met by a quality of obstinate

and resourceful resistance calculated finally to baffle the greatest power. Not only every military but every industrial device would be resorted to and maintained.

The Dutch are conscious of being in no sense inferior to any of us except in mere brute force and size. In civil and religious liberty, in probity of public life, Holland stands by the side of England. But it would be truer to say that she conferred these upon us with the Revolution of 1688 than that she had learnt them from us. In the field of art even France cannot boast a longer period of fine painters; Rembrandt is unique and universal as Shakespeare and Beethoven are unique and universal. In science and criticism she rivals England and France in originality, Germany in laborious and painstaking research. Indeed, she combines the best culture of England, France, and Germany in a degree hardly credible. Her children learn to read and speak all three languages, and frequently study Latin and Greek too. It is little wonder that they pay for this in a certain loss of childish liberty and gaiety. And it is possible that the burden of foreign languages to be learnt has prevented their own literature from rising to the level of their painting. This would account for the fact that Holland to-day hardly takes the place in the conscious thought of Europe to which her moral and intellectual powers entitle her.

In Switzerland one finds oneself again in the continental zone, with its characteristic ideals and outlook: efficiency, obedience, smoothness, faith in the army and in military method—characteristics which prove to be consonant with a free, democratic, and federal state. A conversation I had with a shop-girl in Berne admirably summarizes the national sentiment as I found it.

The German Swiss, she told me, were principally, but not all, in favour of Germany; "except those who had been to England, and they, of course, were for England!" The French Swiss were all for France, but they (the German Swiss) had no fear of their being disloyal to Switzerland, and if they occasionally became more demonstrative than was felt prudent or acceptable to the German Swiss, they were not to be taken too seriously, "because we know that they are more excitable than we are." As for Belgium, Yes, everyone was sorry for Belgium, and everyone took it for granted that she would be restored and compensated after the war. "But it seems to us rather strange," she said, "that they were not more prepared. Of course, I suppose they were relying on England, but we know why the Germans did not march through our country—because we have five hundred thousand men always ready at six hours' notice to take the field. Everyone has his gun in his house, and knows where to go as soon as he is wanted." The moral of

which appears to be that mountains and a gun in your house are more solid realities than scraps of paper. One might search Holland wide and long for a corresponding judgment on the case of Belgium.

This typical conversation is the more interesting from the fact that no people is more earnestly humanitarian than the Swiss. Granted that the right of a nation to survive lies in virtue of its strong right arm, even so our common humanity transcends all national rights. The original Red Cross was born in Switzerland, and it was my privilege in Lausanne to see the immense "Prisoners' Information Bureau" whereby news of hundreds of thousands of prisoners is conveyed to their anxious families, and *vice versa*. It was humiliating to contrast this smooth-running organization with one extemporized since the war, in London—the offices of our Belgian Refugees Committee in Aldwych. Never have I seen so vast and complex a work performed with so much efficiency and so little circumstance as in those three cellar-rooms at Lausanne. Never have I seen one conducted with so much circumstance and so little efficiency as at Aldwych. After all, the continentals can often make our insular institutions look foolish in the extreme.

My particular purpose did not, unfortunately, call me to Italy at that time, but I cannot forbear to quote from the letter of a young Italian a sentiment particularly germane to my subject. Addressing his English father-in-law, he writes words to this effect:—"As I leave for the front I wish you to remember two things. In the first place, that I would ask no better fate than to die for my country, and for the recovery of the Trentino. And, in the second place, that you will talk none of that French sentimentality or English hypocrisy about dying in the cause of international morality." This frankly "Prussian" sentiment, of course, by no means completely represents the movement which brought Italy into the war on our side. But it seems to indicate that Italy is deeply influenced by the philosophy of the power she so long allied herself with, and it is not impossible that—nearly sea-girt though she is, she inherits something of the psychology of Rome, whose utmost land frontier traversed three continents, and whose military organization has left so strong an impress upon all the Latin countries.

No country is harder to characterize than France. Her psychology seems to many to have undergone a radical change since the declaration of war. Everywhere one hears surprise, amounting to something like awe, at the "silence of France." But France has always had two souls. On the one hand, she shares to the full the characteristics of the nations of the Atlantic sea-board.

Like the rest of us, she is adventurous, individualistic, democratic, and independent; more than any of us she is full of fiery audacity and originality. But she is also logical, rigid, exacting, bureaucratic and centralized—the most imperial, the most Roman, power of all.

A trivial and personal but typical little incident occurred as I crossed the French frontier into Switzerland. It was at the Customs examination, early one cold April morning. After the examination of our luggage we had to pass the more exacting examination of passports, and the officials were sharply on the lookout for Germans with false papers. When at last I reached the barrier I passed the first official to show my papers to one I saw was disengaged. I was called sharply back, a summons which of course I obeyed promptly but not apologetically. A fair French smile struggled with the official scowl as my examiner muttered in French, "You're an Englishman all right."

In certain ways the Englishman and Frenchman are so unlike one another, both institutionally and psychologically, that it seems to have been necessary for us to pass together through a life-and-death struggle in order to get to know and understand one another. Yet even this could not have brought it about but for the generosity of the spirit of France. "It is easier," says William Blake, "to forgive an enemy than to forgive a friend." Yet, from the highest officials downwards, there appeared to be a quiet unquestioning confidence in the good understanding between the two nations. Anyone who looks forward to a closer fellowship between the civilized peoples of the world cannot be too grateful for this fact. It might so easily have been otherwise. For my own part, I find it hard to say where the finer quality of chivalry lies, in our ungrudging bestowal of help, or in France's ungrudging acceptance of it.

IV.

But indeed, all the Atlantic nations are something more than friendly to us to-day, and this despite the acute diplomatic difficulties which the practical blockade of Germany has provoked. For we have all earned a living on the sea, and have drunk deeply of the ideals which the sea has fostered in us. If France has remained the most military of us, she has proved that it is from no wish of her own. She recently attempted to establish a reduction of her term of service; she has always supported efforts to enlarge the scope of the Hague Tribunal; and she was obviously unprepared for aggression when this fatal war broke in upon her land. The sea, which is no man's territory, has brought us all together, and it is from the sea there will sooner or later inevitably rise a world-order from which no power can stand aside. I cannot think from what I see in Europe and the world that our long supremacy on the

sea has been seriously abused, or that it has done anything but prepare the way for a consenting federation of the earth. Norway, before joining the Scandinavian pact for a common foreign policy, made it plain that, whatever Denmark and Sweden might do, she stood by us. Over the whole world, she said, England had opened trade routes, established security, buoyed dangerous channels, and given these advantages without grudge to every mercantile marine of the world. Portugal, recognizing the temptations we have sometimes resisted to appropriate her unprotected colonial possessions, has come to trust us implicitly, and to regard herself as our ally. Denmark and Holland, though both having long sea frontiers and jealously treasuring their distant and exposed possessions, have, so far as sea-power is concerned, practically disarmed. France, as is well known, recently removed her navy to the Mediterranean. And a widespread attitude in America is aptly expressed in the amusing story of the German who objected to the American' proposal for universal disarmament. "But some provision would have to be made for policing the world," said the German. "There would always be the British Navy," replied the American.

The centuries of warfare in which we fought Spain and Portugal, Holland, Denmark, France and America, ended in our holding a paramount position on the sea for a hundred years. And it is in that hundred years that our sometime foes have gradually come to form with us a genuine fellowship of nations, in which international law was fast becoming as binding as national law and a universal tribunal the recognized court of appeal. This fellowship has an inevitable tendency to grow wherever the approach to a country is by sea. Japan would never have fought her recent war with Russia had it not been for the new land approach of the Siberian railway. She is now helping England with an enthusiasm scarcely recognized. The South American States are in the main silently with us, and if the United States is politically neutral to-day, it is certain that in the unhappy event of a renewal of the struggle in some future generation, America will come to our aid as inevitably as we came to the aid of France.

It is our unique position in the Atlantic fellowship that affords the only true sense in which we are the champion of the smaller nations. Compared with Germany, America and Russia, we are ourselves a small people, entirely unable to protect all the weaker races of the earth. But in the Atlantic area the sanctity of local patriotism which is the inspiration of our own Empire has gradually asserted itself, and here our power is an effective bulwark of the smaller nations. It was when Germany, who had reaped a rich harvest from the benefits of this Atlantic fellowship, transgressed its spirit by attacking France and overwhelming Belgium, that she

challenged us to its defence. And its triumph in the victory of England and France is the great hope for the establishment of a genuine world polity.

V.

Behind the westward-facing powers of the coast of Europe one enters, as has been said, a zone where a different psychology exists. In Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and even Sweden, a relatively high importance is attached to routine efficiency and diligent investigation, as compared with adventurous enterprise and resource. Italy, on the one hand, and France on the other, are not so easily classified; but, generally speaking, the sea peoples have versatility where the continentals have painstaking thoroughness, outlook where the others have concentration, great individual initiative where the others have highly departmental organization. Whether or not connected with this, either as cause or as effect, it is also true that among the sea peoples a nation's independent character tends to be regarded as something founded on language, race, or national consciousness, and amongst the continentals as founded upon its organized military resources. No doubt both points of view are generally accepted as relative to the question, and it is difficult to draw a true generalization. But the striking difference in *emphasis*, even in small countries like Denmark and Holland, as against Sweden and Switzerland, is significant of a real psychological divergence.

Now it has frequently been alleged that the "armament" psychology of continental Europe is due to the menace of Russia from the East. This, it was said, compelled the Central Powers to maintain immense armies for protection, with the result that they drove their western neighbours into the armament race. The view seems so logical, and derives so much support from the horror felt by the advanced political nations for Russia's repressive internal policy, that it has been accepted uncritically by many of us. It ought, however, to have received fresh consideration after the attempt and failure of the Tsar's proposal for the Hague scheme of general disarmament. If Russia had been the prime difficulty in the way, this step ought to have led to some more definite result in the direction proposed. Even more striking to us was the fact of our repeated endeavours, and our repeated failure, to come to an agreement with Germany for naval reductions. It is evident that the difficulty was not in the East, but in the centre; for, however large our navy, it could never be the menace to Germany that the Russian armies might be; and it became obvious that the German navy had grown beyond the requirements of defence against France and Russia.

Nevertheless, the fact remained that Germany, situated between

France and Russia, had long been in a state of nervous tension. France had a permanent grievance against her, and if it was true that Russia, under a cloak of pacifism, was waiting her hour to strike, this would explain the German armies, if not the navy. At all events, it seemed necessary for anyone wishing to gain a first-hand view of the whole situation to visit Russia. Accordingly I set out early in the summer to discover, if I could, whether our alliance with Russia, was a purely military exigency, the alliance of a radically aggressive with a radically pacific civilization, or if she was, as her action in calling the Hague tribunal suggested, a natural ally of our Atlantic fellowship.

In visiting Russia I discovered, what I had so often heard, that an Englishman who went there was destined to leave his heart behind with the Russian people. This makes the question all the more insistent, How can so lovable a people possess a form of government in certain ways so hateful? And the answer given in Russia is that for centuries Russia has been dominated by Teutonic influences that have poisoned her life at the core. Peter the Great was obliged to draw upon German efficiency and knowledge for means to further his westernising of Russia. He preferred England and Holland, but the proximity of Germany made the Teuton the readier resource. Unfortunately, the psychology of these two races is deeply opposed, and the attempt at amalgamation has proved injurious to both.

Taking the Prussian at his best, I suppose one may say that his watchword is duty, his paramount duty being to the state. But there can be no doubt that the thing that moves the Slav is his affection, and he is incapable of recognizing a duty to anything that does not command his devotion. He has great talent for organization, and the communal life is as natural to him as the family affections; but a bureaucratic hierarchy is something alien and incomprehensible to him, and a government machine, demanding for its efficient administration a cold impersonal sense of duty, had no appeal to the Russian temperament. The officials became corrupt and negligent of the machine, or enforced it upon an unresponsive people by ruthless penalties and repression. It is a piteous tale, and the great hope of this war is that, the machine having to some extent broken down, the local and truly indigenous organization of the country will succeed in maintaining the very important position which it has won during the crisis. Russia has at last had a chance to learn to recognize her own national genius, and it is already a great gain for her to have publicly labelled all her worst offences "German." Even if this is only partly just, it makes it hard for her to return to her vomit.

The view that her crimes are due to some kind of indigestion of an alien element gains support from the fine influences always

clearly at work in the Russian government during the past hundred years. Few countries, if any, can boast a better record of chivalrous action abroad, or of great reforms at home. The present eradication of her national vice of drunkenness is typical. The reform is largely voluntary, as it is not impossible to obtain small quantities of certain spirituous liquors, but it has been estimated that ninety-eight per cent. of the population is now absolutely teetotal, and this is certainly not too high an estimate so far as my observations went. Largely as a result, no doubt, of this, I found a Russian crowd the most delightful company in the world. One never tired of watching the very English-looking children playing their vigorous games in the Petrograd public gardens. The picturesque streets and fine parks of Moscow, the terraces overlooking the Volga at Yaroslav, and Nijni, are full of people so like ourselves that even the very unfamiliar language does not disturb one's sense of being at home; and there are scenes at wayside stations, where the crowds gathered to send off parties to the front, that must always bind one to this cheerful, tender, dauntless people.

Russia may have armies greater than any nation in the world, but the Russians can never be a militarist people. She may have longer to struggle for her popular liberties than any of us, but in the end she will get them. The position of her railways may be dictated by her military needs, but meanwhile they circulate industry, ideas, and education, which will make her future sure. Rome built roads for her armies, but Britain created railways for her commerce, and the railway is the ship come ashore. The vast plains of Siberia and European Russia, like those of Canada and the United States, are rapidly opening their wealth to this new vehicle of commerce, which sprang from our sea-civilization. In countries where the current of political thought was already set, it may have failed to reverse the trend, but it will yet turn the still green civilization of Russia to the type of the Atlantic powers.

And the same will happen in Germany, too, when, and only when, she admits the miscarriage of her military ambitions. Europe and the earth will be grouped into larger corporations as the centuries succeed one another. This is a process which has never been permanently arrested since the dawn of history. The question at issue to-day is as to which type these larger groupings shall follow. Are they to be founded upon a military organization, irresistibly imposing its authority, or are the bonds to be those of spontaneous association in which every land preserves its own historical characteristics, its own patriotic sentiment, and contributes its own genius to the common tasks of civilization? We are fighting to decide whether human corporations are to be of the type that is bound from without, or by something springing from within. It is

impossible for this latter type to be absorbed by the former without destruction. The Atlantic group can never become part of a Germanic polity. On the other hand, if the Atlantic civilization prevails the continental powers will still contribute all that is great in them to the common stock; their massive sense of the corporate life and of the finality of scientific method are all important correctives to so much that is slovenly and unsocial in the British, French, and American civilization.

Even Germany, in the end, will find, like the rest of us, that the scope of her genius is enlarged by the reversal of her military organization. No friend of the world, or even of Germany herself, ought to wish her to come out triumphant from this struggle. A young Russian officer, at a moment of many Russian disasters, said to me as he left for the front, with that light in his eyes we have learnt to know at home, "Yes, this is a blessed war for Russia." The ordeal Russia has passed through will leave her a permanently nobler land. And it will be a blessed war for Germany, if and when she is obliged to realize her military failure. It is our unsuccessful crimes that teach us to understand the sordid nature of crime. Let Germany fail, and she will then look at Belgium and France and Poland and Serbia and Armenia, at the Atlantic, at Austria, and at her own desolated land, and she will have to endure the fierce purgatory of *seeing* what she has *done*. No nation has ever had to expect a more terrible awakening, but if she wakes, posterity may yet look upon this war and say, "Yes, that was a blessed war for Europe."

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JOSEPH WICKSTEED.

Westminster: an Interpretative Survey.

I.

METHOD: THE NON-NATIONAL UNIT.

II.

THE MEDIEVAL CITY: ITS SURVIVALS AND TENDENCIES.

I.

METHOD: THE NON-NATIONAL UNIT.

THOUGH we are about to introduce to the reader what is probably for him a somewhat novel mode of presenting history and using historic analysis for the interpretation of current events, our purpose happily does not necessitate any deep or extensive discussion of method. We need only address ourselves to two simple issues. The first is to indicate the traditional lines of study and research which we seek to continue and develop. The second is to outline the general framework within which we propose to present each historic scene of our interpretative series.

An "interpretative survey" has, we conceive, its purpose and justification in the "outline of policy" which it yields and which is really its extension into the world of practice. On this ground alone it should be evident that our survey of Westminster in no way competes with, and still less makes pretension to supersede, such standard ones as that of Booth on the economic side or of Besant on the historical. On the contrary, we assume both these works as starting points of our own somewhat different endeavour. We not only utilize their data, selecting from their inexhaustible treasures what is relevant to our purpose, but we even endorse and adopt their methods as far as they can be made to serve our ends.

Besant's vision of Westminster was a drama of romantic personalities; or when not rising to the dramatic level, it was at least a pageant of the picturesque past.¹ The essential characteristic of his aspiration to recreate the scenes of the past in lifelike pictures is expressed in the circumstance that he prepared himself—as it were—to write his chapter on the mediaeval Abbey by a visit to the contemporary Benedictine Abbot of Downside.

Charles Booth, on the other hand, in looking at Westminster (as in looking at any other region of London), sees the contemporary city of daily life and toil. For him Westminster is a group of families needing for maintenance definite quantities of food, clothing and shelter, and most of them continuously struggling to rise above the poverty line, or to save themselves from falling below it. And the institutions of the city—more especially its churches and chapels, its schools and taverns—he sees as mainly noteworthy in that they advance or retard the family's daily struggle for survival.

Up to a point the methods of both investigators are the same. The ideal exploitation of each method would involve a house to

1. In his Survey of Westminster he follows this method more closely than in his Survey of London.

house visitation. But while Besant asks: "Of what historic romance has this house been the scene? what notability, maybe, lived here and bequeathed to the place an atmosphere of sentiment? what part did he or she play in the history of the nation, what contribute to its roll of glory?"—Booth, on the other hand, asks about each house, "Who lives here to-day? what income does the family receive? how earned, how spent, and with what result on domestic wellbeing? what neighbouring institutions relate the members of the family to the social life around them, and with what result on the family and the neighbourhood?" The many-sided Besant was, to be sure, an observer and a lover of contemporary no less than historical romance; but he searched for it in mansion and cottage, in mine and counting house, on the seas and the mountains, even (as was the fashion in those days) in the slums—anywhere in short rather than in the daily life of that plain citizen's household which fills the foreground of Booth's canvas.

These two contrasted standpoints—one personal, dramatic and historic, the other social, economic, institutional—we have tried to keep in view throughout our survey, and it has been our effort to combine the data gleaned from each into a single composition.

But we have endeavoured also to continue and develop a third traditional approach to the understanding of the present. The concept of the Future as open to exploration through an investigation of the Present, which again is intelligible in terms of the Past, is a product of those studies which in the eighteenth century flourished under the title *Philosophy of History*. Two seventeenth century precursors of this line of research well expressed its fundamental affirmations in memorable phrases. "The present," said Leibnitz, "is charged with the past and big with the future." Again, the continuity of past, present and future was tersely put in the saying of Pascal (usually attributed to Lessing, who elaborated it in an essay) that the more perfect and ordered the record of tradition, the more the human race becomes as one man, always living, always learning.

During the past two or three generations the "philosophy of history" has fallen into discredit, and practically ceased as a serious occupation for historians. Subjugated by the German ideal of exhaustive research—generally research into the documentary minutiae of a restricted and more or less arbitrary "period"—our professors of history have not only neglected, but even poured contempt upon the search for unified vistas.¹ Yet the quest of unification, in which the philosophers of history were so deeply concerned, was formerly a main impulse to historic inquiry in its

1. The present state of these studies in our universities may be inferred from the following facts. "The Cambridge Modern History," designed to embody the highest results of English historical scholarship, was intended

accepted modern form, so that the want of respect for the wider pre-occupation implies either some want of memory or of gratitude. And it is even a question whether the prevailing academic disrespect for an ideal and a quest which postulated the rationality of world history and stressed the unity of mankind is not chargeable with a large share in producing—or in giving intellectual sanction and expression to—the present fissure of western civilization into an affair of internecine rivalries of nationalities and states.

But let us not be misunderstood. We plead for no abandonment of minute factual research, nor even for its diminution; but only for its subordination to synthetic ideals, and its emplacement in a larger orientation of studies and purposes. We plead also for a broader interpretation of the concept "document," and to that end would generalize the example of Besant, who (as we have seen) affirmed in the most practical way his belief that for a study of the Benedictine Order, a live Benedictine abbot was a primary and indispensable "document." This is by the way. What we desire to affirm is our belief that a renewal and development of the "Philosophy of History" is urgently needed and that not only for its own sake but also because it should prove an active solvent

to wind up with a survey and examination of philosophies of history. In the opinion of Lord Acton, projector and architect of the work (and its editor throughout, had he lived) there was one man only in Great Britain capable of presenting that culminating study—and he was a Scottish theologian with a leaning to the French systematic tradition. To Professor Flint, accordingly, Lord Acton appealed in a letter in which he said: "That we may conclude well and with effect I have proposed that the last chapter should be on operative philosophies of history, on condition of course that you consent to write it . . . *there will be no such chapter if you should inauspiciously decline.*" The italics are ours, and further comment is perhaps superfluous. Yet the sequel is worth noting. (1) Flint being unable to comply, the History appeared without the needed philosophical survey which should have completed and indeed crowned it. (2) Acton died before the first volume was published; and in the hands of his successors and their collaborators the great work projected by this illustrious Liberal (in no partisan sense of that term) has become in effect—without advertisement, without intention, and largely without its being perceived—the chief literary monument of the anti-idealist and anti-democratic Reaction which has prevailed so exceedingly during the past half generation, and perhaps nowhere more completely than among academic and scholastic professionals of England. (3) Prof. Flint died more recently; and the fact was noted by "The Athenæum," if we remember aright, in a line or two of its Literary Gossip, where it announces also the special contents of forthcoming popular magazines. Yet to many that death seemed the passing of the last of the Europeans: in the sense in which the great thinkers and scholars of the Middle Age and the early Renaissance were Europeans—not only in audience and reputation but in the habitual view and abode of their mind.

of national animosities and so would make for the recovery of European sanity. For the needed re-orientation of traditional studies many changes, alike of form and substance, are prerequisite. One of the most vital pre-requisites, it seems to us, is that students of historical synthesis should agree upon some *non-national* unit of investigation, and that it should be a unit which, like the "species" of naturalists, is unquestionably adapted to those concrete collective methods of research which, in the long run, ensure some measure of definite progress in the established sciences. That such a concrete unit is afforded by the "city" is an assumption running throughout the present endeavour to interpret Westminster—Past, Present and Incipient—by the aid of concepts derived in considerable measure from various traditional schools of the philosophy of history.

Thus, in so far as our method has novelty, the novelty resides in an attempt to present the history of a representative city in terms of personal drama, and simultaneously also in terms of economic and social institutions and the general movement of civilisation. In other words, we seek to combine (in principle) the historic or dramatic method of Besant with the observational or scientific method of Booth and the generalised method of philosophy. But these methods are rather two than three, since the observations and classifications of science, whether of things past or present, have their natural and proper fruit in the generalizations of philosophy. For this two-fold enterprise a special notation has to be contrived, and it should be one that has the qualities of symbolism at its best, *i.e.*, at once pictorial and diagrammatic. Such a desideratum means, of course, a large initial difficulty. But the difficulty, which is at first an obstacle, should act also as a stimulus when we remind ourselves that progress in the arts and the sciences alike is intimately associated with the development of notation. The scheme of notation here offered (though the product of many years' experimentation by the present investigators, and of at least two generations of predecessors) is, of course, to be regarded only as a provisional solution—a first approximation towards the more perfect system that would grow out of a more extended research and more enlightened endeavour.

The scheme exhibits the element of personal drama in 84 sketches which compose into the larger groupings of a developing series of social situations. All of these, again, may be read not in terms of personality but of types inheriting and transmitting a given tradition; acted on by a given milieu and, in turn, reacting on it. When so read the history of the city, previously observed as a drama of personalities, appears in the impersonal guise of social evolution. By a little effort the notation may be read both ways simultaneously, just as a pianist reads at the same time bass and

treble of the musical score. And, as the bi-manual efforts of the musician are rewarded by the revelation of higher harmonies, so the civic student discovers in the end that this two methods are really one, for he comes to see the process of social evolution as itself a higher kind of drama: nothing less poignant than the drama of the human Prometheus in ceaseless contest for the mastery of his fate. And is it not true that in this continuing labour of the Titans the city is incomparably the most efficient instrument of mastery and likewise its highest reward, doubly therefore symbol of victory? And if so, then it follows that each citizen, in the measure that he identifies his own life with that of his city, becomes participant in this the supreme drama of life—a drama in which the historic cities are assuredly the most abiding players, for is not their influence undying? Our notational scheme, then, is devised to show the life of the citizen intertwining with that of his city, and both together playing a rôle of increasing clearness, purpose and achievement in the secular drama of Humanity, of which the whole world is the stage.

For illustration of the method let us turn to Plate I. (between pp. 267 and 268)—“Medieval Westminster”—and consider its framework and the placing of the twelve drawings therein. Recalling that the distinction between State and Church, now of secondary import, was in mediaeval times primary and vital and in the daily consciousness of all alike, high and low, we describe that elemental bifurcation in the more general form of contrasted but co-ordinated Temporal and Spiritual Powers. The drawings on the left hand page show three successive phases of the Temporal Power; the drawings on the right hand page show the corresponding phases of the Spiritual Power.

As representing the Temporal Power the king with his barons occupy the first square and the serfs—later becoming townsmen—the second square. These two aspects or hemispheres of the Temporal Power are shown in three successive phases as they change from time to time. On the opposite page are shown in a parallel series of views the corresponding Spiritual Power as represented by the Secular Clergy with their flock in the first square, and the Regular Clergy in the second.

Here, then, in Plate I., we present a picture of mediaeval Westminster as a typical city of its era. The bottom line of four drawings read horizontally across the double page shows what might be technically called the “social situation” characterizing the origins of mediaeval Westminster; the second line shows the “social situation” at the climax of the era, and the third or top line that of its decline. The twelve sketches taken altogether are designed as a *time section* of the middle age in its growth, maturity and decline. Each of the three horizontal sets taken by itself is

designed to serve as a working model of the mediaeval system at a given phase of its development.

Now the transition from the middle ages is, as it were, the hinge of modern history. Of the many transformations which turn on that hinge one of the most significant is the change in thought from the controlling idea of social fixity to that of social development. The very notion of a social science emerged, in point of historical fact, at the moment when Comte detected in the vital components of the mediaeval system *general types*, and proclaimed them as the formative elements of all social mutations. In that moment of insight into the social process the science of sociology was born. It is therefore in direct continuity with the main line of sociological tradition that we should take our analysis of the mediaeval city and make it the pattern of our general framework. In other words, by re-naming its parts in general terms, the framework is made to serve also for other periods.

Hence, for the analysis and description of subsequent eras, use is made of Comte's generalization of the mediaeval social quartet, Barons, Serfs, Seculars, Regulars, into Chiefs, People, Emotionals, Intellectuals respectively. In each case, the Chiefs and the People, dominantly functional in a given era, are—whatever their precise political or social description may be—termed its Temporal Power; similarly the Emotionals and Intellectuals, then dominantly functional, are termed its Spiritual Power—again adopting Comte's conception of history as the interplay of Temporal and Spiritual Powers.


In defence (if defence seems called for) of this somewhat apparitional and unexpected classification of social types as Chiefs, People, Emotionals and Intellectuals, it may be remarked that though introduced by Comte in this form into modern sociology, it outcrops in one form or another, with more or less clearness, in the writings of reflective observers from Plato and Aristotle to H. G. Wells and Arnold Bennett. Plato's Guardians, Artisans, Poets and Philosophers are manifestly chiefs, people, emotionals and intellectuals. Even such also are Aristotle's Citizens, Labourers, Teachers and Philosophers. Amongst Mr. Wells' "Modern Utopians" the normal types were classed as Kinetics and Poetics, each of which again exhibited two main varieties, the more active and the more passive—that is, there were plus kinetics and minus kinetics or chiefs and people; and plus poetics and minus poetics or emotionals and intellectuals. A verification wanting neither in directness nor actuality may be found in the fact that Mr. Arnold Bennett, with his keen naturalistic eye, found, in a recent visit to the Clyde, men in that complex situation sorting themselves out into Organisers, Workers, Energisers, Initiators—a nomenclature

that goes straight to the root of the matter. Again, if a symbolism is wanted for the four types, one may be found ready made in the tradition that gives us our playing cards. "Spades" is a misrendering of the Spanish espada, a sword, and obviously stands for the chiefs, while equally do clubs, hearts and diamonds for people, emotionals and intellectuals respectively.

Adopting, then, Comte's two master generalisations, and also his nomenclature both for social types and for social formations (as temporal and spiritual), let us lay out the formula in a way which will show, as it were, the anatomy of the social order. Taking squares of equal magnitude for the four social types, let us bring together the chiefs and the people on the left hand side, with a small intervening space, to indicate their partial and fitful cohesion as a Temporal Power. On the right we similarly indicate the natural separation of emotionals and intellectuals as social types, yet also their tendency to come together and constitute a Spiritual Power. Finally, by bringing all four into a single line and separating the temporal from the spiritual pair by a wider space, we indicate (a) that in any given "social situation" all four types tend to emerge and play their respective parts; (b) that the four elements of the situation compose into a temporal and a spiritual couple; (c) that these couples combine in varying degrees of intimacy and interdependence to organise, to work, to energise and to guide the "movement" that tends to issue from a "social situation," as a stream from its source. As a further convention with a touch of symbolism, an endeavour is made throughout to represent Temporal Powers by Exteriors and Spiritual Powers by Interiors.

It has, of course, to be remembered that in applying such a formula straightway for analysis of a whole city, state, nation, or civilization, we can only expect roughly approximate results. A "social situation" on a large scale has its real elements not so much in individual types as in a graduated set of minor "situations" to each of which in turn the formula should be first applied. Thus for adequate historical research innumerable subsidiary situations have to be analysed methodically, stage by stage, in an ascending series towards a climax which may be civic, national or supranational. Moreover the analysis of its varied temporal and spiritual powers should be made for each successive generation or, better still, each half generation of the period under investigation. Such a propædeutic obviously implies organised research far beyond the present endeavour, which must needs content itself with a modest tentative.

Thus the general scheme here adopted for analysis and presentation of each successive social phase is:—



It is this form we would stress with all emphasis as the **KEY PLAN** of the notational scheme. To practise the reading of history and to interpret current events in each of the two ways implied by the formula, and to continue the exercise until the mind works automatically in both the consequent methods, is our urgent counsel. Fill in each square with its relevant personalities, and you get the dominant social situation of the day read as drama. Trace the past filiations of these personalities and you get the dramatic reading of history. Interpret the same social situation in terms of temporal and spiritual powers and trace their past filiations, you get a rendering of contemporary life and of social evolution as the interplay of larger forces. Such forces, to be sure, work through individuals, but their efficient instruments are wars and religions, systems of law and philosophy, organized industries and experimental sciences. All of these have their institutional forms, which again integrate into the quasi-personal entities of city, nation, state, empire, etc. It is our contention, as stated above, that the city is the most concrete and continuous of these high protagonists, and consequently is the most suitable unit for naturalistic studies of social evolution. Moreover, by taking the city as our unitary concept in a purposive interpretation of evolving life, do we not the better preserve an ideal of "personality" as the culminating expression and supreme issue of life in evolution? Can the greatest of nations and empires compare with the historic cities in intensity of Personality, if we mean by Personality dynamic power to select and gather together the finest threads of life and out of them create noble and beautiful types of culture? Are not the great historic cities transcendent in this respect; and are they not so determinant in the moulding even of their most creative citizens, that these, as culture-heroes, splendid though they be, yet appear but the by-play of a civic demiourgos?

Departing but slightly from well established convention, we choose the following eras or "periods," through or in which to trace the growth of Westminster city:—

Historic—

1. Mediaeval.
2. Renaissance and Reformation.
3. The Civil War and the Restoration.

Recent and Contemporary—

4. The Parliamentary era.
5. The Ministerial era.

Plates I. to V. thus trace the changing phases of Westminster proper (the precincts of the Abbey and of the Houses of Parliament, *i.e.*, the old city and Whitehall) in the above periods. In two final plates an endeavour is made to analyse and pourtray those tendencies which mark incipient Westminster.

The ever growing complexity of the modern order derives from the continuance and interaction of past "social situations" in the present formation. In this civi-complex, the aim of the historic survey is to analyse out with increasing approximation to reality first the simpler surviving "social situations" and next the incipient ones.

Hence a survey of contemporary Westminster resolves itself into (a) a study of surviving Temporal and Spiritual Powers, (b) a selection of such tendencies as we may observe and judge to be of special significance towards the development of Temporal and Spiritual Powers that are in course of incubation.

In sum our whole presentment is of the life of Westminster, historic and contemporary, as a drama in five acts (Plates I.—V.). That which our method enables us to discover of its continuation into the future is indicated in what might be called the Epilogue of Incipient Westminster (Plates VI. and VII.).

It may serve at once to display the character of our formula and to test its value if we essay an application to a topic of current interest. Consider the "social solidarity" instantly effected in each belligerent country by the outbreak of war. It was relatively easy for (say) Mr. Asquith and Mr. Will Crooks to combine with each other and with (say) the Rev. Dr. Clifford and Mr. Sidney Webb. Because the two former, though they do not have their precise spiritual equivalents in the two latter, yet match them historically, being all four representative respectively of chiefs, people, emotionals and intellectuals within the Parliamentary Order; all of them would place that institution centrally in their social system, though each might wish to use it differently from the other three. But not only did these four unite into a single quartet; further, they joined in the same orchestra with (say) Lord Derby and his peasant tenants, the Bishop of London and the Oxford professors of Divinity. And that was indeed a feat of harmony, since the latter four—as respectively surviving chief, people, emotionals and intellectuals of the mediæval order—would, under less exigent conditions, have sung to a note of different and

probably discordant pitch from that of the Parliamentarians. The truth is that the parliamentary scale and the mediæval scale are both of such range that at a certain pitch the characteristic note of each is capable of combining with the other into a simple harmonic chord. The rarity of the social combination measures the difficulty of discovering that particular pitch.

Now war is undoubtedly a great awakener, and it is all to the good that the nation should be roused so far towards unity. But when this good has been gained (confessedly at a severe cost) it at once presents to us a new and urgent issue—how not to be arrested there, still less to slide back, but to push on to a deeper and more lasting unity. This can scarcely be effected by war directly; for that, besides being an expensive and fitful way of evoking the simplest kind of national harmony, fails to evoke the more complex harmonies of ideas, perceptions and the goodwill to initiate, that are requisite for high social endeavour, and it has moreover the disadvantage of provoking a corresponding international discord.

William James projected as a countering ideal "the moral equivalent of War." The dangers of the lifeboat, of fire brigade and fever hospital service will always appeal to adventurous youth and are so far moral equivalents of war. But how to devise altruistic exploit on the grand scale that will fire the heart of whole social classes? It would be out of place to attack that problem here, but let it be remarked in passing that we hope to contribute something towards its solution later on in the survey. Here we have merely to claim a relevance for our method of historic notation, since that, we believe, is capable of a certain efficacy in the educational preparation that must be preliminary to the greater task of social unison.

To make this point clear let us again have recourse to the musical metaphor. Suppose, as indeed the metaphor assumes, that the chiefs and people, emotionalists and intellectuals, of each order have their characteristic notes, all of the same pitch, and thus spontaneously compose into the distinctive—so to say "specific"—melody of that order. (There will, of course, be found several varieties of that particular melody as one passes under observation, in each separate nation of the same civilization, the surviving examples of the given social order.) Now, the supposition that the pitch of each social note is capable of composing with each and all the others into a chord of harmony depends of course upon our combining them according to the discoverable laws of some general music. That such a general music exists, at least for each nation, the example of the war shows; it also shows how little we know of its laws and their working.

It is our contention that the interpretative survey in its historic application is, as it were, a rough and ready first approximation to

a chromatic scale for the music of western civilization. If the student were diligently practised in its exercise, would not that constitute a sort of mental preparation for the higher social harmony? He would at least learn in turn to play the melody of each surviving historic order, and so might fit himself to take his part in the concert of the whole. And if by a change of habit in the fashion-making classes the pleasing process of musical adaptation by interpretative survey should become a customary educational discipline, we might not have to wait till the next war for another national concert!

In some vital respects the method of presentation outlined above is anticipated and applied to general history by Mr. Gooch in his "Annals of Politics and Culture," the original scheme of which, as the author tells us, was designed by that admirable Crichton of modern historians, Lord Acton. Mr. Gooch's book indeed may be used as a supplementary statement of events and items implicit in the "social situations" indicated in the drawings of our illustrative plates, so far as these, in exhibiting the history of Westminster, resume or reflect the general occidental history of their period.

"No presentation of history," says Mr. Gooch in his preface, "can be adequate which neglects the growth of the religious consciousness, of literature, of the moral and physical sciences, of art, of scholarship, of social life. Numerous handbooks deal with politics alone and a few with what the Germans call 'Kulturgeschichte,' but no systematic attempt has hitherto been made either in English or in other languages to combine them. The plan of the book, which not less than the idea, represents a new departure may be briefly explained. The left hand page deals with Politics, the right hand page, with what I have termed, for the sake of brevity, Culture. The Politics and Culture of each year are as nearly as possible level, in order that the reader may see at a glance what was taking place in the chief departments of thought and action at any given moment."

In his record of "politics," Mr. Gooch interprets that word in a wide sense and includes the main events of economic history. But taking "politics" in its narrower sense, it is roughly the history of the directing classes as they change from age to age. In this sense political history is the history of the "chiefs," and in a similarly restricted sense, economic history is the history of the "people." The politics and the economics of a particular era may be regarded as the two correlated facets of the form into which crystallizes the Temporal Power characteristic of that era. But as every individual action has its corresponding states of feeling and of thought, so the collective action systematized as political and economic has its emotional and intellectual accompaniment in that

grouped similarity of dispositions which prompts many individuals to common action. And when such similarity of disposition becomes sufficiently pervasive to give a distinguishing mark to the age, it takes form in various organisations which together become the dominant and effective spiritual power of that age.

The historical scholarship of the past two or three generations (largely under Germanic influence) has emphasized economic and political history, and has treated religion, art, literature and science as so far subordinate as to be practically negligible in the history of states and their policies, or in the determination of industrial development.¹ The result of this one-sided treatment of history is that no need has disclosed itself in recent writings, for a nomenclature to indicate the correlated two-fold aspect of public life as temporal and spiritual. Thus, when Mr. Gooch introduced the method of narrating "Politics" on one page and "Culture" on the opposite, he made a notable departure in English historical scholarship. It was indeed a bold attempt to return (to be sure, on a higher spiral) to a tradition antecedent to the present vogue, which isolates from the general milieu the State with its immediate scheme of interests, elevating them to that dizzy pinnacle on which they would seem now to be tottering.

Of all the western nations infected by this political erastianism, France, if it did not absorb least of the poison, has yet preserved in more vital activity the necessary corrective tradition. It is on that tradition we have drawn in an endeavour to continue Mr. Gooch's initiative, and to supplement it in our presentation of Westminster by a more systematic analysis of the contents represented by his "Politics" and "Culture." We adopt Comte's formulæ of historic analysis and filiation in amplest recognition of his genius, and of the genius of a nation which in its attempts to keep alight the spiritual torch in a material age has earned the title of "eldest daughter of the Church" in a deep sense, though perhaps not quite that originally intended. But with this acknowledgment of indebtedness must go also a *caveat* against possible misunderstanding. To borrow two analytical formulæ from the treasure house of Comte's innumerable generalizations manifestly

1. It is the misfortune and not the fault of German scholarship that its amplest development and consequent maximum influence on civilization should have coincided with that historic moment when political temporalities were most absolute in the Western world. The origins of that particular type of sovereignty were to be sure general rather than German, while the earliest authoritative theorizings from that point of view were not German but Italian, French and English. It was, nevertheless, the thoroughgoing German scholarship of the nineteenth century that gave system and academic status to the theory of the Absolute State throughout the universities of the world and especially impressed it on British and American professors of history and speculative politics.

implies no formal adherence to his philosophical system and still less to the practical applications of it which its author and his followers have sought to make. One may observe and wonder at the processional spectacle of "Chiefs and People," of "Emotionals and Intellectuals" all playing their parts in the never ending drama of Temporal and Spiritual Powers—a drama of unimagined complexity, for each combination struggles incessantly to maintain itself against rivals, predecessors as well as successors actual and incipient. Without being a Positivist one may thrill to this Pageant of the Past marching full-panoplied into the Future and creating the Present as it moves along—just as without being a Roman Catholic one may enjoy the moral satisfaction of fasting from meat on Fridays.

Truth to tell, the beguilements of political materialism and its twin vice of economic dialectics have little temptation for the student of history who, searching like the naturalist for concrete objects of observation, finds them in a "comparative anatomy" of cities. The reason lies in the very nature of cities. Perambulating the cities of Europe with map and guide-book in hand, and reading their past by the aid of survivals, the naturalist historian watches the rise and multiplication, now of cathedrals and abbeys, again of universities, academies, and museums; now of theatres, picture galleries and concert halls, again of schools, colleges, and all the manifold kinds of cultural and technological institute. These, the infinitely opulent manifestations of spiritual influences, clamour for attention and interpretation, not less but more insistently than do the castles of kings, the palaces of princes, the halls of legislators, or the bureaus of officials. Thus comes salvation from political materialism to the student of history who walks and watches. And to him also comes liberation from the vice of economic abstraction; since the highways and the waterways of commerce, the markets of traders and manufacturers, the exchanges of brokers and bankers, are certainly not less conspicuous to the peripatetic observer than to the sessile student of economic "documents." But it is impossible for the former to overlook and forget the homes and the family life that give meaning and purpose to all the apparatus and processes of trade and industry, for is not every city on first observation and in last analysis but a cluster of homes? It is a cluster of homes provided well or ill with means for continuing the life of the spirit from generation to generation. Through them the city as it develops becomes for good and evil the human and material embodiment of that continuing spiritual life. The generations of citizens in their passage reflect and absorb, create and are created by, the spirit of their city.

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II.


THE MEDÆVAL CITY: ITS SURVIVALS AND TENDENCIES.

As to the origin of Westminster, we adopt the theory—so vividly elaborated by Besant and endorsed by our foremost geographer¹—which makes it a Ford-Town, as London is a Bridge-Town. Let us therefore begin with the sketch (Plate I, fig. 2) which aims at reconstructing a typical scene at the ford. The era we select is that of the early Anglo-Saxon conversion to Christianity. London Bridge had not been built. Travellers and traffic from the north and the Midlands to the continent crossed the river at Westminster, because it was the first fordable place above the Thames estuary. Here therefore of necessity was the junction of the northern highways with the road to the continent which, passing through Rochester and Canterbury to Dover, ran along the firm ground between the estuary marshes of the Thames and the almost impenetrable Weald forest.


The highway from the north, known as Watling Street, debouched at this ford and continued on the other side of the river as Dover Street. Later, when London Bridge was built, Watling Street took a bend in the neighbourhood of what is now Oxford Street and ran thence towards London and its bridge. Previous to that, travellers and drovers, packmen and pilgrims, who had traversed Watling Street continued along Park Lane into the Green Park (taking place-names as they are to-day). There they found themselves on the border of the marsh land that has become St. James's Park. This was crossed along a way indicated by stakes. At the further end of this way, and just on the edge of the river, where Westminster Abbey now stands, there was a little neck of firm and rising ground (some three or four feet above high tide mark) called Thorney Island.

Imagine the state of mind of our traveller or drover from the north as he stood on Thorney Isle about to venture on the passage of the great river. He had but just waded through a quarter of a mile of treacherous marsh and swamp before arriving at this exiguous and momentary *terra firma*. Now he must plunge bodily into the river, again committing himself to the sole material guidance and support of stakes, and would have to wade for it, maybe breast high; contending all the way against the force of the current, and nervously mindful of what might befall him at treacherous places in the muddy bed. Given a traveller about to embark on so perilous an adventure, easily conceived is his need of a priest to confess, absolve, and hearten him—to put him *en bon*

1. Mackinder. "Britain and the British Seas." P. 256.



PLATE



9. WESTMINSTER PALACE.



10. MARKET PLACE.



5. WESTMINSTER HALL.



6. CRAFTSMEN BUILDING OWN HOUSES



1. KING SITTING AT JUSTICE.



2. THE FORD

MEDIAEVAL

L.



11. ST. MARGARET'S.



12. ABBEY SCRIPTORIUM.



7. PARISH CHURCH (WITH BISHOP).



8. MONK AND NOVICE.



3. PRIEST SHRIVING TRAVELLERS.



4. HERMIT.

WESTMINSTER

courage, for the chances of this world and the next—by all the resources of religion. The resulting situation is depicted in fig. 3, where our artist shows a priest shriving travellers. Here then in the performance of such rites are the imaginative beginnings, not of Westminster Abbey and its Regular Clergy, but of its work-a-day complement, the parish church of St. Margaret's with its Secular Clergy. The work of the secular clergy in its broad social purpose was the emotionalizing of the people, by which we mean of course vitalizing, strengthening, calming. In that sense the seculars were the emotionals of the age, and the ceremonial ritual of the parish church must be judged as to its efficiency by these vital standards.

For the doing of justice in the disputes and crimes that would inevitably arise in such a situation as that of an incipient Ford-Town, we must imagine a periodic visitation of the King. Hence the sketch showing the royal judge sitting at justice in his tent with attendant knights (Fig. 1). If it be thought that this simple form of kingship is irreconcilable with present-day notions of royalty, the answer is that originating functions do not of themselves determine contemporary usage any more than good intentions necessarily make good deeds. Ceaseless social education is as useful in the one case as unending self-education is in the other. But if the confirmation of survival be desired, did we not recently learn from the press that King Nicholas of Montenegro numbered amongst his routine of duties the dispensing of justice in his capital from an open air seat under a tree, and that, moreover, he was, in person, his own chief of police?

We come now to the origin of the Abbey itself. Let us suppose that the conventional stage was preceded by that of the hermit. Where may we look for his original seat? There is to-day a block of buildings, known as St. Ermin's Mansions, a few hundred yards to the west of the Abbey, which may give us a clue. For it is so named because it stands on what used to be called Hermit's Hill, a slight eminence which was doubtless relatively higher before the successive building operations and road mendings of several centuries had raised the level of the surrounding soil. For the man of seclusion, a frequent moral type in the ages of religion and faith, this would be a natural site from which to observe the busy drama of the ford and yet remain himself detached from its activities. The opportunity to observe or retire at will into contemplation would supply the stimulus needed for successful pursuance of the meditative life. Such a simplest primitive origin of the cloistered and ordered life of the regular clergy is pictured in fig. 4. This stage has been put in the background for us by the more organized form and enduring memorials of that which succeeded, but it is well to recognise in the hermit the precursor of

the monk as we know him in the West. That general transition, which in early mediaeval Europe took place so widely, from solitary hermits to conventional groups, would have its local illustration at the ford of Westminster in the foundation of the Benedictine Abbey which now stands there.

Passing over long centuries of preparatory development, let us come to the higher expression of the Middle Ages. As a social system its working may perhaps be seen at its best in Westminster about the middle of the twelfth century, in the time, say, of Henry II. A town has grown up on the island of Thorney, wherein liberated serfs are settled as craftsmen. A group of them (Plate I, fig. 6) is seen building one of those fine old timbered houses which testify to the artistic skill with which the people build for themselves, in a civilisation that has known how to incorporate them in the culture of the age.

The parish church of this town is shown in fig. 7, and was the round arch predecessor of the present St. Margaret's. The church, it will be seen, is thronged with worshippers, mostly townsmen and their families, but members of all classes are mingled in the devotion of the common faith. Let us assume the presence on this occasion of a neighbouring Bishop, officiating at some notable festival in the parish church. The emergence of the Bishop as a magistral personality, at once a religious and social power in the land, is one of the most significant and characteristic traits of the Middle Ages. The episcopal blessing was no piece of ritualistic punctilio but a real uplifting of the people. The effective sanctity and the far-reaching influence of the mediaeval bishop rested on his real power of heartening the people, or at his will putting the fear of death and the torments of hell into the mind of wrongdoers, high as well as low. But the question is how and to what end did he use these unique powers? The cure of souls implied then as it is beginning to imply again the care of bodies, social and civic, as well as personal and domestic. In the social therapeutic of those times, the private and the public life were not divorced, but both were aspects of one single and indivisible life—that of the community. The bishop was therefore above all a designer and a builder of community life, parochial and civic, rural and urban. To concentrate and co-ordinate to this end all the available spiritual resources of the age was, is and must remain, the episcopal ideal.¹

Turning to the chiefs in this the constructive phase of mediaevalism, we observe that the growing organisation of justice from Westminster as a national centre has brought into existence

1. For a detailed study of how the episcopal system worked in the Middle Age through the popular theatre and other arts focussing in the cathedral, see Branford, "Interpretations and Forecasts," ch. v, pp. 204-232 (Duckworth & Co., 1914).

Westminster Hall, with its accompanying housing accommodation for the King and his court. A view of New Palace Yard from the river is shown in fig. 5. It received the epithet "new" when William Rufus added to the old Palace of Edward the Confessor the great Hall which is to-day all that survives above ground of that palace. The King is assisted by a Great Council, which later is to become the Parliament; but the old Palace, with its new hall, is still mainly to be thought of as the King's house in Westminster wherein he and his Council sit as Court of Judicature at certain times in the course of the year. The Court was an itinerant one, holding its sittings periodically for a routine of judicial and other functions at many different cities such as Winchester, Gloucester, Worcester, Lincoln, York, etc. These were the regional capitals which later sank to the status of "provincial towns," as the centralizing city grew—at their cost.

The scene taken as characteristic of the Abbey at this period is a monk instructing a novice in the rule of conventional life (Fig. 8). In this ordered transmission of the spiritual heritage from age and experience to youthful ardour lies largely the secret of monastic persistence and stability. In the intimate contact of King and Abbot by which the thought and wisdom of the latter guided and fortified the judicial and governmental activities of the former lies, we must assume, no small part of the Angevin kings' success in building the foundations of the English constitution. In short the Abbot and his monks served at this stage as the true and functional intellectuals of their social order, just as the secular clergy with the Bishop at their head served as its true and functional emotionals.

The final mediaeval phase which we have selected for illustration may be considered as taken at any point in the period from, say, the beginning of the 14th to the end of the 15th century. Feudalism and Catholicism as a social system are declining, though there continue to be built, in great numbers and magnificence, churches, abbeys, and cathedrals. The castles of the nobles, formerly places of strength and simplicity (*i.e.*, fortresses), are beginning to be transformed into mansions and even palaces, increasingly sumptuous. The King's court is no longer an itinerant Court of Justice but stationary in the Palace of Westminster and rapidly becoming a courtier's court. Besant indeed estimated that there were at this time as many as 20,000 people attached in one way or another to the court, counting those housed in Westminster Palace itself and those serving it as workers and tradesmen living in its immediate purlieus. A contemporary view of New Palace Yard is shown in fig. 9. It will be noticed that where the King and a few knights were previously seen, there is now a great retinue of courtiers, and that the simple architecture of the previous buildings has

given place to examples of more ornate intention. The chiefs are ceasing to be chiefs of the people and tending to degenerate into a parasitic caste.

The present Abbey church of the decorated style has been built with funds gathered in all the many ways practised by the Middle Ages, including a continental levy (apt illustration of real European unity). The increased magnificence of the building has been accompanied by a decline of spiritual life. Instead of the aged monk helping the young novice through the stages of initiation, as in the previous sketch, we have now a single scholar immersed in the refinements of the Scriptorium (Fig. 12). On the one hand the court, increasingly forsaking the pursuit of justice for war, sport and the arts of display; and on the other the Abbey, increasingly substituting scholarly and aesthetic interests for the ordered sequence of prayer, praise and meditation—they are each drifting further from the other and suffering the penalties of isolation. The isolation is not only of the court from the abbey, and the abbey from the court, but of both from the people and from the city.

The parish church is the St. Margaret's we know to-day, of ornate perpendicular style. The worshippers are still numerous, but their ardour has decreased as the adornment and enrichment of the building has increased (Fig. 11). The life of the secular clergy is not devoted with the same zeal as formerly to the care and uplift of the people. The ceremonial service has grown more elaborate in ritual, more aesthetic in material equipment, more dramatic in presentation. But the spiritual life of the priest and of the parishioners does not march together with the intimacy of old. The emotionalizing of the people is ceasing to be an absorbing activity of the secular clergy, as the intellectualizing of the chiefs had ceased to be a leading interest of the regulars.

There were, then, elements of disruption arising spontaneously within the city. They were elements characteristic of the mediæval system in general. They are but samples of its many internal tendencies towards decay. Now, our survey of the mediæval period has so far been reduced to briefest limits, partly because the presentation is not made for its own sake, but only by way of an approach to the study of Westminster as it is to-day, and may be to-morrow. Partly, however, also to find room for consideration of certain tendencies which ran counter to the process of decline. Emerging into prominence more especially towards the end of the period, were elements of vitality which gave promise of a new crystallisation around the popular life of the city. Of these significant recommencements some developed into realities, others suffered early arrestment and thereafter exhibited themselves as barely perceptible tendencies. To-day they may be observed as survivals, in fact or in tradition, if not in Westminster yet in other

cities. To-morrow they may be renewed everywhere as initiatives.

Our concluding sketch therefore shows (Fig. 10, Plate I) the market place of Westminster as focus of that popular life which contained the seeds of re-birth. The people are here presented in a reconstruction which is not wholly imaginary. Though not indicated with any precision in the earliest plans of the city, the old mediaeval market-place is nevertheless marked incidentally on a plan of the seventeenth century, which, by a fortunate exception, happens to be drawn to scale. By means of Sandford's map of James II's coronation procession we can therefore locate the old market-place with exact precision on the contemporary town-plan. Its centre was roughly at a point made by the intersection of two lines, one drawn from, say, the north end of Westminster Hall to the Horse Guards entrance, and another drawn at right angles to it from the main entrance to the Local Government Board in Parliament Street. It was a small market-place, between 40 and 50 yards square, and had (in Sandford's plan) a permanent structure of covered booths or stalls in the centre, probably of the kind indicated in our artist's sketch.

The market and all its memories have so completely vanished that even the laborious archaeologist would seem never to have felt the call to go in search of its traces. Oblivion so complete may be interpreted as a comprehensive and definitive token of the profound transformation that differentiates modern from mediaeval Westminster. It may also be interpreted as indicating certain points of exceptional difference that mark off mediaeval Westminster from more typical cities of its period. For, unlike other regional or national capitals of its time, the business life of the city never came to focus under the consecrating shadow of a cathedral spire, that fit and lasting emblem of the mediaeval endeavour to subordinate economic to ethical ends. Nor yet in its later growth did Westminster, like some of its continental compeers, develop that unique pair of temporal and spiritual institutions, the Town Hall and the University; institutions which elsewhere in adequate working correlation each with the other, gave a city not only intensest efficiency, but also afforded noble expression to its dignity, pride and independence. But another civic product of mediaeval inventiveness Westminster did have—a great and imposing Bell-House. In beauty of workmanship, richness of adornment and exquisiteness of design, it was in no way comparable to the famous belfries of Flemish cities. But still a remarkable structure, with a peal of bells which enjoyed a European reputation, as we learn from no local chronicler, but from Matthew of Paris and at least one other continental traveller and narrator. Let us pause for a moment to consider the character, use and significance of this belfry, and its rôle in the life of the people. Its history we must also briefly

recount, for the incidents of its origin, maturity, decline and extinction make an instructive commentary on the half millennium which has mainly bequeathed our effective social heritage to-day.

Built simultaneously with the present Abbey-church in mid-thirteenth century, the Westminster Bell-house had definite civic purpose in the well ordered planning of those luminous and large-minded times. Doubtless intended to link the life of the Abbey and the Palace in close intimacy with that of the city, it was appropriately placed at the fourth angle of an irregular quadrilateral, of which the other three corners contained respectively the market-place, the great hall of the palace and the Abbey church. To carry its peal of four, or perhaps five bells (one of them said to be the largest in the world) a tower of cyclopean masonry rose to a height of 60 feet and was surmounted by a lead-covered spire. The base of the tower was 75 feet square, so that its mere magnitude precluded the market-place as its site, even had there been no larger civic purpose determining its erection elsewhere. With its spire the belfry certainly overtopped by a long way the tower of St. Margaret's, and in all probability all other buildings also, for the present western towers of the Abbey church were not then built.¹ It rose above the city, we may well suppose, like a watchful sentinel aspiring to a unity which, if never fully realized, was yet assumed as a social ideal, affirmed in the religious scheme, planned in architectural design, and in a measure achieved in the actual life of the city. In the synoptic vision of the bird's-eye-view, the belfry and its spire would replace the parish church as symbol of mediæval Westminster's emotional life, for St. Margaret's tower was left unfinished till recent times. Thus a variant of our formula of chiefs, people, emotionalists and intellectuals emerges as follows:—

PALACE. MARKET PLACE. BELFRY. ABBEY.

To give æsthetic expression to our survey of the mediæval city as a whole and to put an accent on the above fourfold aspect, is the purpose of the imaginative reconstruction which has been drawn for frontispiece.

A lay Guild was charged with the care and due functioning of the belfry. And for many generations—certainly for more than two centuries—did the brethren of the Guild make known through the pealing music of its bells the great happenings of the day. In the mediæval scheme of things the bells of the parish church literally played their part of sustaining the corporate emotion of the citizens. They chimed each birth and marriage, they tolled

¹. In his imaginative sketch to show the belfry as it probably was in the thirteenth century, Mr. Lethaby ("Westminster Abbey and the King's Craftsmen," p. 58) makes tower, spire and apical cross rise to a height of nearly 200 feet, which far exceeded the highest point of the Abbey before the addition of Wren's western towers.

each death and funeral, and thus every parishioner shared, in a measure, the joys and the sorrows of all the families of the parish, in ages when the sense of community was stronger and richer than most of us now can even conceive by an effort of the imagination. Similarly were the several parishes knit into the wider community of the city by the more sonorous music that issued from the great belfry, for this enabled every individual of the body civic to participate instantly in the larger issues of life and death. War, fire and pestilence, peace and pageantry, the coming and the passing of successive abbots, the birth and death of princes, royal weddings, coronations, and exalted visitings—all were announced from the belfry. The mysterious power of arousing and communicating emotion which belongs to great bells pealing from lofty towers was deliberately used to large social purposes. Every one, without distinction of sex or age, wealth or status, was united by the music of the bells, for therein they thrilled to common ecstasy or throbbed to a common grief. And moreover, be it remembered that the music of the bells beyond giving a collective relief to agonies in the life cycle, and a collective enhancement to its ecstasies, had also a further civic function. It voiced the message and intensified the visual appeal of that spectacular life which as pageant, play and procession, emanated from church and guild, from cloister and from court, like the spreading odour of an aromatic plant.¹ It may fairly be argued that between that vital pair—City and Citizen—there was achieved a depth and continuity of unison such as can hardly be grasped by their pallid successors

1. "The shops were shut; and the Bishop ordered a great and devout company of priests and friars in a solemn procession accompanied by the nine aldermen and by all the officials of the Commune and all the people; and all the more worthy were ranged in order near the said picture with lighted candles in their hands; and then behind them were the women and children very devout. And they accompanied the said picture as far as the cathedral, making the procession around the close after the usual manner, *ringing all the joy-bells* for devotion to so noble a picture." This is a scene from the mediaeval chronicle of an Italian city; but the occasion of it—Duccio's painting, or rather a portion of it—is now in Westminster, as another portion is in Berlin. Both pieces must at one time or another have been stolen from a Siennese altar. In their present habitat they are a standing accusal of metropolitan cities given rather to the gathering of foreign loot than to the glorifying of their own artist-craftsmen. Naturally therefore metropolitan cities of to-day have military processions and other cities have none of any kind. We may further note as surviving evidence, that church bells expressed the very spirit of community, the notion that only those born within the sound of Bow Bells were true Londoners. Bow Church stood opposite the Guildhall in the open centre of the mediaeval city's forum. It is now all but closed up with shops; and therefore awaits clearance and renewal for the restoration of spiritual life to the modern "city" of full shops and empty churches.

to-day, the Individual and the State; whose habitual means of intercommunication are the tax-gatherer, with his inquisitorial "schedules," and the journalist, whose metier under existing conditions almost compels him to alternate between the distributing of chill "news" and the industrious daily kindling of the stubble-fires of brief "sensation."

From its origin in the thirteenth century till its catastrophe in the sixteenth, the Belfry of Westminster is in the happy position of having no recorded history. Then its great bell, and even its smaller bells, were taken down and robbed by Henry VIII towards supplies for furnishing a military expedition against his personal rival the French king. The care and functioning of the belfry had before this been removed from its proper Guild, and transferred to St. Stephen's, the private chapel of the palace: sure sign and stigma of the monarch's declining interest in the life of the city and the people. It was doubtless advanced by Henry's legal counsellors as one of the reasons for the subsequent spoliation of the particular Guild, which formerly had charge of the belfry, that its main public function was no longer being performed!

By the time of Elizabeth the citizens had so far progressed in the new dispensation as to have actually forgotten the original use and meaning of the belfry. Even the learned and conscientious Stow records as fact, the contemporary legend that it had been built by Edward III as a belfry for St. Stephen's chapel—a legend which, besides ignoring the original purpose of the belfry, post-dates its erection by no less than a century.

Incidentally this anecdote of sixteenth century ignorance and distortion of thirteenth century life (by scholar and populace alike) is worth noting for another reason. It gives a clue to much contemporary misunderstanding about the Middle Ages. For it is from survivals continuing into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, debased by renaissance misuse and misinterpretation, often aggravated further by eighteenth century myopia, that are derived most of the notions current to-day as to what "mediaevalism" means. A further example of defamatory superstition about the Westminster belfry found in many modern books asserted as historical fact is the legend that its bells were only rung for coronations and funerals of kings. There is probably about as much truth in that as an account of thirteenth century custom, as in another Elizabethan legend that the ringing of the great bell turned all the beer in the cellars sour!

During the seventeenth century the belfry, having already lost its soul, could offer no resistance to any who would despoil its body. It is not surprising therefore that the lead covering of its spire was removed—as likely as not to make bullets for Oliver's soldiers. The spire of wood doubtless soon decayed, but the solid masonry

of the tower which had carried the great bells resisted equally the disintegrative powers of nature and the spoliative passions of humanity.

Even more lasting than the solidest of masonry are the channels of emotion. It was therefore only to be expected that in the eighteenth century the material shell of the old belfry should again revert to its original use of housing the stuff of emotional arousal. It became the cellar of an adjacent tavern. One of the ever recurrent penalties of civic disorganisation is the resulting reversion of emotional life to that primitive habit which seeks the mystic state by an alcoholic short-cut. And this is true alike for chiefs and for people. Promptly, at the outset of the renaissance, the despoiled "people" began to domicile their spiritual life in the taverns that everywhere throughout Western Europe proliferated in the disintegrating cities of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While as for the chiefs, they also, after their first flush of aesthetic and intellectualist aspiration had subsided, followed the people to the same spiritual goal. Anecdotes illustrating the attraction with which Westminster taverns appealed to our legislators in the eighteenth century are too well known to need recall. Thus it came about in the fulness of time that a common stream of emotion, literally flowing from the old belfry, again united high and low among the citizens of Westminster.

The power of that stream to sweep aside any obstacle seeking to hinder, divert or diminish its habitual and secular flow has received in our own day a manifestation which will rank among the memorable incidents of the Great War. For it is an open secret that what chiefly stood in the way of the success of King George's call to the nation to forego the social and private use of alcohol in every form while the war lasted—and what rendered in effect nugatory the thoroughgoing and sportsmanlike example which he himself set in the matter—was just the impossibility of reconciling such a self-denying ordinance with a certain Parliamentary tradition and its accretion of sinister influences and perverse interests. "Freedom and Whisky gang thegither," says the Scottish poet, and fitly enough the House of our Liberties enshrines the most illustrious and not the least frequented "private bar" in Christendom. It is not the only instance known to archaeology of a stately edifice being built around a sacred wellhead or source of magical waters. Recalling here the Dionysiac connexion with oratory, and consequently recognizing the symbolic character as well as the historic continuity of the House of Commons bar, we perceive also that there was a kind of religious sanction for the aspiration of the noble legislator who wished rather to see England drunk and free than sober and enslaved.

But to return. The intellectuals also in the eighteenth century

gave restored attention to what remained of the robbed and mutilated structure of the belfry. It became an interesting ruin. It was measured, sketched, described, and theories were propounded as to its origin. Learned men scoffed—the authority of Stow notwithstanding—at the lingering tradition, kept faintly alive by the people, that it had once been a belfry. That it had been a belfry with civic functions would, had the idea been mooted, have seemed still more unrelated to historical fact, and inherently absurd! There was no consensus amongst the scholarly investigators as to its original character. But of three favourite hypotheses one identified the ruin with a fourteenth century church of the Holy Innocents; another, made it a Nonconformist chapel of the seventeenth century, while the third affirmed that it was a kind of fortress built as an asylum for those who fled into the sanctuary of the Abbey! The third hypothesis gained strength with age till, towards the end of the nineteenth century, its momentum of tradition carried away even the well-stored mind and vigorous commonsense of Sir Walter Besant.

During the age of the Industrial Revolution the belfry suffered the same fate as had overtaken the market-place. Mediæval Westminster, as a city, became all but submerged in the tide of new bricks and old cupidity set aflowing when the "energy" of the machine era applied itself in that quarter of the world. The last remnants of the ancient belfry completely disappeared from sight. What may have been left of local tradition was too feeble—and what is worse, too lowly and of the people—to find expression even in considerable histories of the city. And so, when it came to Besant's time, we find that he does not even mention the market-place and makes an extravagant mistake about the belfry. Nevertheless its foundations of indestructible masonry remained below ground, waiting the opportunity to testify of themselves and the vanished social world to whose higher life they had ministered. The opportunity came and in a fortunate hour. For it was during Mr. Lethaby's architectural wardship of the Abbey that they were exposed in the course of neighbouring building operations. The discovery was viewed by him—most civic and architectonic of his guild—and the significance of the remnants was at once perceived and socially and historically interpreted. Hence to the details of its long and chequered story, accumulated by loving care and punctilious scholarship, there have now been added data for the exact location of the old belfry. The detailed information on hand is even sufficient for its imaginative reconstruction, as of extinct animals by the naturalists. It remains for a coming generation to utilize all this store of recovered and verified knowledge. Not for any archaic idolatry of mere rebuilding, but for fit and effective renewal, at once material and spiritual, of the usages to which the belfry at its best was put.

The belfry at its best stood for the enrichment and unison of emotional life in the mediæval city. But the spiritual life, to be adequate, must be intellectualized as well as emotionalized. The brain of the citizen must be disciplined and informed, as well as his heart charged and attuned. He must be instructed and educated, and at the same time stimulated and guided towards noble activities. The monasteries more and more failed to do this intellectual work for the community, in the surging times of the later middle age, so that a new type of educational institution was manifestly called for. It appeared as the University. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries universities grew like mushrooms in the cities of Italy and southern France. The cities of the north were relatively barren in this respect, though the three most famous and efficient of all universities had for their birth-places Paris, Louvain and Oxford.

As to Westminster, the too close intimacy of palace and abbey and the prolonged tutelage of the city to both, have been pointed to in explanation of the fact that the city produced neither Town Hall nor effective guild system, neither cathedral nor university. Even the belfry was a royal gift: and the abbot nominated the chief burgess to office. It is an historical truism to say that the presence of a monarch's court is not conducive to intellectual activity. It is a simple moral inference to affirm that the mitred abbot was a figure of too overpowering prestige to admit the permanent abode of a bishop in his vicinity. All these were real reasons for the arrestment of civic life in Westminster; yet they are local and special. There still remains for discovery the common factors relating the local circumstance with the general movement. Here we must be content to say that the failure of Westminster to produce a university was but sample of a general infertility of northern cities. No doubt the surviving civic tradition of ancient Rome accounted for something of the higher cultural potential of southern cities. But this is too general a factor to be of use as an interpretative clue, bearing in mind what deep foundations had been laid for the permanence of that tradition in every region of Europe and beyond it. What we need is something more definitive and specific.

The universities even more than the cathedrals owed their parentage to the cities. In its beginning, the university was just one among the crop of guilds that attested the exuberant vitality of cities in the later middle age, the high individuation and strong communal sense of the citizens. It was only when success had declared the permanence of the university movement that lawyers discovered that the new institutions needed "constitutions," and popes and kings hastened to "grant" them charters and to plant out colleges of their own making. Where then the guild tradition

was most endemic (as surely it was in southern cities), we should look for the earliest springtide and most exuberant flowering of the university movement. But the whole question is obscure, and awaits further investigation. What we are here concerned with, however, is not the historic origin of universities, but their functional relation to civic life.

Observe therefore how the coming of the university, by completing the social outfit of the city, had a peculiar and definitive spiritual significance. Given Town Hall for its chiefs, Guilds for its people, Cathedral or Belfry for its emotionals, and University for its intellectuals, a city was, in itself, endowed with the full complement of temporal and spiritual institutions. Let us set out the rectified situation in terms of our fundamental formula :—

Town Hall.	Guild.	Cathedral	University.
		and (or)	
		Belfry	

Here then was a new phase, a veritable re-birth, of the mediæval system, emerging as the older and more characteristic phase was lapsing to decay. The old phase had been more aristocratic and rural, in a word feudal. The new one was more democratic and urban, in a word civic. The former was characterised by a preponderance of castles and abbeys. The latter sought to redress the balance with its guilds, its belfries and its universities. As to the cathedral, that occupied a midway position. It was essentially a civic institution ; yet the bishop's diocese was a Regional unit, and so gave wide room for an episcopal reconciliation of feudal and civic interests. But the bishop was handicapped by the aristocratic bias of his "intellectual" ally the abbot. The men and the minds of the cloister (an institution which has many disguises, one of them being the Club) inherently lean that way, and the tendency was too often reinforced by the motives of simony, not only in the convent but in the episcopal see also. All the greater need on the civic side for the creation of universities, if a working adjustment and equipoise was to be made among the conflicting social forces. The early university was the guild of teachers or scholars, and happily sometimes of teachers *and* scholars. And the academic, like other guilds, when it desired authentication sought it from the local bishop, because he stood nearest to the city as its spiritual overseer and protector of the people. He, if his policy were dictated by diocesan interest, would naturally desire to see established not only a civic but a Regional university—the intellectual counterpart of his cathedral, though not necessarily in the same city.

From whatever cause, the early development of universities does, in point of fact, show observable tendency to focus at regional

centres. What produced the first mushroom crop would seem to have been a fashion that sped through southern cities for each to have its own university; and even (running to extremes, as is the way of fashion) two in the same city. Of that first crop a good many withered as rapidly as they grew, others again were removed from less to more suitable cities. The early or pre-patronage phase of the university movement was thus characterised by a natural sorting and shifting on a basis of regional selection.

Meantime, the contrast of the feudal and the civic order was being widened by the tendency of the chiefs on both sides to break with, and to drift away from, their associated spiritual powers. As the respect of feudal chiefs for the Church declined, their appetite for its property grew. By indirect and devious means there had been an extensive and growing diversion of ecclesiastical wealth to private use, long antecedent to the organised pillage of the Reformation. The consequent increase of luxury was significantly expressed in the popular saying that it took a priory to feed a noble family and an abbey to clothe them. The reaction of the new standards of aristocratic life on ambitious burghers, enriched by the growing profits of foreign trade, would naturally be to seduce them from allegiance to the civic order, and to convert them into plutocratic variants of the feudal chiefs. Increasingly leaderless and forsaken by their proper intellectuals, who tend too much, as we have said, to attach themselves to the chiefs, the people of the cities became the victims of exploitation and parasitism on every side. Handicapped by these temporal and spiritual dead-weights they gradually sunk to that level of depression and impoverishment which finally, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, made them the hungry and facile "hands" of the new and not less ruthless order of chiefs brought to the surface by the Industrial Revolution. But from this telescoping of a half millennium of social history we must return to the later middle age.

The coming of the Friars expressed the final and supreme effort of the old spiritual order to harmonize things all round, and renew the mediaeval system for a fresh advance on a higher and more civic level. That stirring upheaval affected Westminster only indirectly. By the immense impetus it gave to Oxford, it confirmed what had apparently been already determined by natural selection—that neither Canterbury nor Rochester, neither London, Westminster nor Reading should provide the Regional University. But the regional university though not, as far as we know its dim beginnings, a civic institution in the sense here taken, yet arose in no secluded spot, but in "one of the first municipalities of England," as J. R. Green tells us. Certainly its early tendencies could not be called aristocratic in the great days when many, perhaps most, of its students slept on straw in garrets, unless they preferred rushes on a kitchen floor.

By changing its concerns and curriculum from a regional and European to a national outlook, and from a democratic to an aristocratic culture, Oxford participated in the general movement of transition from mediæval to modern times; and thereby adapted itself intimately to the changing character of Westminster. With the renaissance, the two cities entered on a correlative development as the spiritual and temporal hemispheres of a single civic unit; or say rather, as twin cities specializing respectively on the theory and the practice of Government, and the congruent views of life. That a highly perfected adjustment between Oxford and Westminster became fixed at the renaissance, and that the co-partnership has continued to work efficiently up to these days, will not be seriously questioned.

This concurrent development of the civic dyad Westminster-Oxford is of course a special case of the larger temporo-spiritual drama, which occupies the background of our canvas, and affords at each successive stage of the survey the needed clue to its interpretation. Let us conclude our mediæval survey by returning to Westminster for a local observation of survival, which is charged with renewal and at the same time is typical of the general background which we have been considering.

In the public garden which embanks the river by the House of Lords there has quite recently been erected, under the very shadow of the Victoria Tower, a statue. It is Rodin's group, "The Burghers of Calais." The oft-told tale is told again, in bronze, by the master-sculptor of the age. All of them emaciated, in rags, haggard, some bent and broken, others proud and erect, the six burghers of Calais stand debating the English king's offer to save the city at the price of their own lives and their dignity—for they were commanded to bring the keys of the city with halters round their own necks. The symbolic intensity of the piece is in its representative character. These assuredly are the true "representatives of the Commons," rather than the frock-coated and silk-hatted gentlemen who occupy cushioned benches a few yards away on the other side of the House of Lords.

Consider the issue of the age-prolonged struggle between the feudal and the civic order. On the one hand, a patriciate continuously recruited and expanded by the incorporation of the new rich of each passing generation, magnificently housed, splendidly furnished, sumptuously fed, beautifully appareled. On the other, the degradation of cities, deepening from the close of the middle ages till the civic revival in the nineteenth century. Of that revival perhaps the most hopeful element was and is the resumption of the middle-age movement for civic universities. By its arrestment, or diversion to aristocratic purpose and the social uses of the inillustrious rich, the cities of Western Europe in general, and

especially those of England, had for centuries been deprived of their most vital organ of spiritual power. And a peculiar bitterness is added to the wrong when we remember that it was an organ created not only for cities but by them.

If a dramatic date be wanted for the close of the middle age in its civic phase, it is not difficult to find one similar to that of the sack of Constantinople, which scholars take as the conventional beginning of the Renaissance. About midway in the sixteenth century there occurred an event which academic historians usually dismiss with curt notice. They tell it ostensibly as simple fact, but in reality they convey an insinuated interpretation. The Oxford specialist, who records the life of Charles V in the current issue of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, reserves from eleven columns of biography half a dozen lines for the chronicle of this event. His version is that "Charles in person punished the rebellion of the city of Ghent (1540)." That is how the ruthless and complete destruction, once for all, of the independence of the city of the Van Arteveldes presents itself when viewed from the feudal end of the telescope.¹ From the civic end it looks like the final disaster, the symbolic culmination of a long-drawn tragedy. The life of the Middle Ages expired in that catastrophe.

Of innumerable minor tragedies, misinterpreted or unrecorded, in the more far-flung, sporadic drama of civic degradation, the Rodin statue at Westminster stands as survival and symbol. Happily it stands also for renewing associations, both within and without the nation. Almost at the moment of the unveiling of the statue a British army was defending Calais against feudal War Lords who, to the old renaissance game of plundering the Flemish cities, add the new "scientific" refinement of burning their universities. And in the defending army, it is well known, the sons of the English aristocracy are not only bearing their full share of sacrifice and responsibility with a splendour of cheerfulness and absolute devotion, but are also coming to know the qualities and the life of the "people" by an unprecedented intimacy of comradeship. But why should not something of the moral élan and generosity, the goodwill and the good humour of war be maintained and carried forward into the subsequent peace? If that could be brought about, the Burghers of Calais would have come among us to good purpose. Their presence in that unlikely *milieu*, with the reminders, at once heroic and shameful, which it

1. The completeness of the break in the life of the city is faithfully reflected in the face of its Town Hall, and to this day gives it the appearance of monstrosity. The Gothic and the Palladian portions, built respectively before and after the extinction of civic liberties, the confiscation of civic property, and the judicial massacre of elect citizens, are as though a man's profile were Caucasian on one side and Mongolian on the other.

must ever renew, would become an evocatory appeal for the "sacred union" of chiefs, people, emotionalists and intellectuals here at home. And abroad (assuming there as here the needed redemption by internal transformation and civic conversion) of states, of nations and—why not?—of empires. Then indeed would these representatives of the Commons hold their place beside the Temple of Peerage no longer like ghosts of the injured and outraged, come to claim vengeance for the past, but as the bringers of a supreme gratitude and as the heralds of a call to the enlarging ideals of community, which would quench the sense of all ancient wrongs and light a new star in the heavens for their nation and ours to steer by—in sympathetic courses friends for ever!

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